Special Treatment

正The health insurance for foreigners at my company does not cover visits to English-speaking doctors. This isn’t as bad as I first thought because the English-speaking doctor susually don’t speak English anyway.Beijing has a very wide range of medical options. The high end is very     

STRUCTURES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT: REVOLUTION VERSUS SECESSION IN RWANDA AND SRI LANKA

A structural framework of ethnic politics is presented, contrasting the patterns of inter-ethnic relations found in ranked versus unranked systems of ethnic stratification. This framework allows us to account for why ethnic conflict erupts in some cases but not others, and why that conflict takes the form of ethnic revolution in some situations and ethnic separatism in others. This framework's explanatory utility is illustrated with a comparison of case studies: why ethnic separatism emerged in Sri Lanka while ethnic revolution occurred in Rwanda.     

Competition and R&D cooperation with universities and competitors

This paper analyses the relationship between competitive environment and R&D cooperation with universities and competitors. Our simple model suggests that cooperation creates benefits in terms of synergies but also induces costs due to spillovers. Since the value of these synergies and spillovers depends on the competitive pressure, cooperation propensity depends on the competitive environment. Differentiating between the dimensions of competition, we hypothesize that university cooperation corresponds to quality competition, while horizontal cooperation relates to price competition. Furthermore, we predict that a higher number of competitors reduces the incentives for horizontal cooperation as it diminishes the gains from “collusion”. We test these hypotheses using Swiss firm-level panel data that allows us to control for simultaneity of cooperation decisions and endogeneity of competition. Our empirical analysis supports the relevance of distinguishing between competition dimensions and cooperation partners, respectively. We find that price competition has an influence on university cooperation in the form of an inverted U. Quality competition only has an influence on university cooperation and the relationship shows a U-form. Moreover, we see that the number of principal competitors reduces cooperation between competitors.