House members as residual claimants: Campaign spending in the 1980s

Through 1992, federal election campaign laws and House rules permit U.S. Representatives holding office on 8 January 1980, to personally claim unspent campaign contributions when they retire, while other House members have to forfeit such sums. These rules provide differential incentives to pre-1980 members to more aggressively seek and yet refrain from spending political contributions than other House members. Regression estimates suggest that the privilege was worth almost $71,700 to the typical pre-1980 House member during the 1987–88 election cycle.     

Improving linear computer assisted learning

This paper draws upon research done at the Centre for Law and Computing at the University of Durham into different types of Computer Assisted Learning ('CAL') programs in law. The research concentrates on linear CAL programs and the features which authors may wish to incorporate into their programs in order to increase their effectiveness. It examines four linear CAL programs which were written with the specific goal of developing an understanding of basic legal principles. The findings of the research highlight the limitations of linear CAL, whilst making several specific suggestions how such programs should be implemented and enhanced.     

Wesen und Systematik des Integrierten Küstenzonenmanagements und daraus resultierende Anforderungen an Inhalt und Umsetzung

Diese Kurzdarstellung soll ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des Integrierten Küstenzonenmanagements (IKZM) sein. Sie will insbesondere dessen inhaltliche Anforderungen verdeutlichen und die daraus resultierenden Erfordernisse an die nationale Einführung eines IKZM herausarbeiten. Dazu wird die IKZM-Strategie zunächst überblicksartig vorgestellt, um danach anhand der aus den europäischen Vorgaben resultierenden Komponenten deren Systematik und grundlegende Regelungsgehalte herzuleiten. Danach werden die bisherigen nationalen Aktivitäten zum IKZM kritisch betrachtet, Defizite benannt und auf die Gefahr der Verwässerung des IKZM-Gedankens hingewiesen.     

Federalism and the Safety Net: Delinkage and Participation Rates

Since the enactment of welfare reform legislation in 1996, thefederal government and the states have emphasized putting theneedy to work and reducing caseloads. Simultaneously, however,national policymakers delinked eligibility for cash assistancefrom eligibility for other safety-net benefits. Contrary tostated policy, though, this delinkage has led to declining participationin the case of Food Stamps and health-insurance programs forlow-income children. We highlight four factors that states mustshape if they are to narrow this gap between policy promiseand program performance by fostering higher participation. Weshow how our focus intersects with enduring questions of Americanfederalism—the level of state commitment to redistributiveprograms, their capacity to implement these programs effectively,and the degree to which states can augment governing capacityby becoming more genuine laboratories of democracy.     

The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature

In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators' party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.