Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed Member Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan

How do mixed‐member legislative systems influence legislator voting? While the literature remains inconclusive, this article suggests party influence as an intervening variable. Through an analysis of roll‐call data from Taiwan and Korea, no deviation is evident between district legislators and legislators elected by proportional representation. Further disaggregation of what it means to vote against one's party again finds little evidence of a tier distinction, while party variables remain significant. The findings are suggestive of a contamination effect between tiers, consistent with the influence of parties.     

Comparing Agenda Content and Roll-call Behaviour in Regular and Lame-duck Sessions of the House of Representatives, 1879–2010

This paper investigates how agenda content and floor behaviour in the US House of Representatives vary across regular and lame-duck sessions. The presence of departing members created a legislative environment marked by increased ideological and participatory shirking, resulting in higher levels of uncertainty. That uncertainty affected how members devised proposal strategies in the face of more fluid voting patterns in lame-duck sessions. The analysis of a unique data set comprised of roll-call votes on House floor motions with an identifiable sponsor from 1879 to 2010 (the 46th to 111th Congresses) uncovers significant changes in the relative frequencies of particular categories of votes, in the success rates on votes within those categories, as well as in the spatial characteristics of floor motions. These findings underscore how the move to the lame-duck session ushered in a distinct and different legislative environment.