OxyContin and a Regulation Deficiency of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Rethinking State-Corporate Crime

On May 10, 2007, three executives of the pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma pled guilty in federal court to misleading doctors and patients about the risk of addiction and potential for abuse of OxyContin. Additionally, Purdue Pharma paid over $600 million in fines and other payments to the United States government and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The drug OxyContin was first introduced to the market in December of 1995. Warning signs of the drug’s potential for abuse were almost immediate, and there were reports of copious amounts of the drug being diverted into the black market for recreational use. In some cases, criminologists have argued that if the government fails to protect its citizens from the harm of a corporation then such behavior should be considered state-corporate crime. We critically evaluate the case of OxyContin to see if it falls under the state-corporate crime paradigm. Further, we argue the state-corporate crime paradigm can benefit from an increased focus on the organizational structures of regulation agencies.     

HOW JUDGES DECIDE WHETHER SOCIAL PARENTS HAVE PARENTAL RIGHTS: A FIVE‐FACTOR TYPOLOGY

Courts have issued conflicting rulings regarding the rights (e.g., custody, visitation) and responsibilities (e.g., child support) of non‐biological gay parents. This analysis establishes a typology of five factors that most commonly influence judges' decisions. These factors include: interpretation of parenting statutes, legislative intent, parental intent, legal documents establishing parenthood, and the child's best interests. Despite these common themes, there is still much discrepancy among court rulings. Based on this analysis, there are steps parents can take to protect their legal rights and living arrangements. Finally, policy suggestions are offered for courts and lawmakers. These legal actors can take steps (e.g., clarifying statutes) that would provide certainty for families in case of parental separation or the biological parent's death.     

Cracks in the Opposition: Immigration as a Wedge Issue for the Reagan Coalition

The absence of a core means that a majority coalition can never choose a policy that will keep it safe from minority appeals to its pivotal members. In two dimensions, strategic minorities will always be able to offer pivotal voters attractive policy concessions. We argue that this instability of multidimensional politics explains why minorities raise wedge issues and how wedge issues result in partisan realignment in legislative politics. Applying agenda‐constrained ideal point estimation techniques to immigration debates, we show that the Reagan coalition—pro‐business and social conservatives—has been vulnerable on the wedge issue of immigration and that parties have switched their positions on immigration over the last three decades. We use the uncovered set as the best‐fit theoretical solution concept in this legislative environment, to capture the limits of majority rule coalitional possibilities and policy change in the two‐dimensional absence of a core.