Hu Bo, (Trans. Zhang Yanpei; Ed. Geoffrey Till) Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century; Strategic Planning,Policy and Predictions (Routledge: London and New York, 2019) 274 p. $124.00 hardcover; $46.36 e-book

Journal of Chinese Political Science -     

Too central to fail? Terror networks and leadership decapitation

ABSTRACT

Leadership decapitation, as a means of hindering the operations and hastening the demise of terrorist organizations, has been the subject of a growing body of research. However, these studies have not examined how an organization’s position in a broader network impacts its ability to weather decapitation. We argue that highly networked organizations possess characteristics that make decapitation less effective. To test this argument, we combine data on leadership decapitation with network data on terrorist organizations and find that well-networked organizations are resilience to leadership decapitation. Our study has implications for our understanding of how terrorist organizations respond to counterterrorism efforts.     

Death of the East Asian Goose and the Rise of China’s Geoindustrial Policy

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its associated domestic industrial policies represent a parallel trade and investment strategy that challenges the Akamatsu principle of the Flying Geese pattern of industrial development in East Asia. This paper is positioned against the dominant orthodox theory of national systems of industrial development in East Asia. It argues that China’s trade and industry policy in the 2012–2017 period has demonstrated that government will expand its industrial policy market intervention rather than retract, moving away from the regional economic integration order by moving industrial production and import trade away from the Asia-Pacific along a Westward axis to the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. Implications are that the emergence of China’s geoindustrial policy will subvert multilateral trade norms as China begins to institutionalise its external trade and industrial policies.     

Media corruption and issues of journalistic and institutional integrity in post-communist countries: The case of Bulgaria

From a normative standpoint the media are usually seen as one of the pillars of a national integrity system, entrusted with the tasks of exposing and preventing acts of corruption and educating the public of the harm caused by corruption. Nevertheless, corruption continues to be one of the most significant challenges that Europe faces, undermining citizens' trust in democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of political leadership. Evidence suggests that in fragile EU democracies such as Bulgaria, despite more than eight years of full membership and numerous preventive measures, corruption is rife and the press is hardly capable of exposing abuses of power or authority. On the contrary - drawing on in-depth interviews with 35 Bulgarian journalists - this paper argues that since communism collapsed in the late 1980s the media in post-communist societies such as Bulgaria has gradually become an instrument to promote and defend private vested interests, and is plagued by corruption. Senior journalists and editors cast serious doubt over the ability of the post-communist free press and journalism to act as a watchdog for society.     

Age differences (or lack thereof) in discriminability for lineups and showups

Previous research reveals that showups are an inferior eyewitness identification procedure to lineups, but no single study has compared younger and older adults' identification decisions for both of these procedures. We had witnesses watch a mock crime video and then make an identification decision from a fair lineup, a biased lineup, or a showup that contained the perpetrator or a designated innocent suspect. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis showed that identification accuracy was higher from a lineup than from a showup for both age groups, even if the lineup was biased. In addition, calibration curves revealed that witnesses were underconfident when choosing from a fair lineup but overconfident when choosing from a showup. These results reinforce prior research asserting the superiority of lineups over showups.     

Notes on contributors

Robyn Eckersley: Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.

Arne Naess: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Translated and revised by David Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

M. Annette Jaimes, ed.: The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance. Race and Resistance Series, Boston, South End Press, 1992.

Alexander Wilson: The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992.     

Regulating balance sheet audit: A game theoretical analysis

Summary  The decision situation implicit to balance sheet audit is modelled as a game theoretical model and examined for its behavioural implications. Possible types of decisions are identified as Nash equilibria. The basic game model is characterized by an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Its properties are discussed in detail with respect to alternative scenarios of statutory audit. The regulatory propositions of separation between audit and consulting, on the one hand, and the rotation of auditors, on the other, are analyzed in the context of the game. It turns out that these measures may have contradictory effects on the quality of the balance sheet audit and it depends on the specification of regulatory details and the reaction of the agents whether the one or the other effect dominates in the end. Another proposition to enhance the audit performance is the extension of the liability of statutory auditors. Prerequisites for the success of this measure are that either no professional liability insurance exists or that, if otherwise, deductibles are calculated as a fixed percentage of the loss. The examples refer to German legal rules, however, similar legal rules are valid for most of the developed market economies.     

How Green Was My Valley? An Examination of Tournament Theory as a Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms

The tournament model is a widely used mechanism to control opportunistic behavior by associates in law firms. However, this mechanism can only operate in certain economic (and social) circumstances. When those circumstances do not exist, the model breaks down, and with it the ability to control opportunism in the absence of some alternative mechanism. Prior research has not investigated whether the utilization of a tournament model prevents the opportunistic behaviors identified as grabbing, leaving, and shirking. In order to test the limits of the tournament model, it is necessary to find particular historical moments when the economic environment radically challenges assumptions/premises of the model. The dot-com bubble in Silicon Valley provides precisely such a time and place. This article demonstrates limits to the applicability of tournament theory. Those limits are to be found in the economic environment in circumstances in which: (1) exogenous reward structures offer many multiples of internal rewards; (2) demonstrably high short-term rewards outside the firm starkly contrast with the delayed long-term rewards inside the firm; (3) the managerial strata reduce their emphasis on long-term recruiting of potential partners in favor of short-term productivity by young associates; and (4) firms develop departmental leverage ratios in excess of their capacity to monitor, mentor, and train recruits.