Terrorism and Transportation Policy and Administration: Balancing the Model and Equations for Optimal Security

September 11 was the catalytic event that clearly demonstrated that transportation security was a virtual myth. We had obviously overinvested in efficiency-based mechanisms and procedures while the security and safety standards provided by effectiveness considerations were being increasingly ignored. This article analyzes the increasingly dangerous situation as it unfolded and provides an Emerging Entrepreneurial Management and Public Policy Model designed to provide insights towards rebalancing our transportation security and public policy considerations as we attempt to design, implement, and pay for optimal security systems to deal with the terrorism threats we face in the early twenty-first century. Rebalancing the model and the equations will require increased focus, will, and skills. It will also be a lot more expensive . . . in both the private and the public sectors.     

Continuity and change: the administration of George W. Bush and US policy toward Taiwan

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific.     

Policy and power: A conceptual framework between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ policy idioms

During the last few decades, both policy practices and policy idioms have drastically changed. Concepts such as interactive planning, network management, stakeholder dialogue, deliberative democracy, policy discourses, governance, etc. have replaced older ones such as public administration, policy programmes, interest groups, institutions, power, and the like. Although we recognise the relevance and importance of this shift in vocabulary, we also regret related ‘losses’. We particularly regret that the concept of power has – in our view – become an ‘endangered species’ in the field of public policy analysis. We therefore will develop a framework to analyse power – being a multi-layered concept – in policy practices in this article. We will do so on the basis of the so-called policy arrangement approach, which combines elements of the old and new policy vocabularies. In addition, we draw upon different power theories in developing our argument and model. As a result, we hope to combine the best of two worlds, of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ idioms in policy studies, and to achieve our two aims: to bring back in the concept of power in current policy analysis and to expand the policy arrangement approach from a power perspective.     

The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements

We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply three stability concepts that capture the notion of open membership and exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting. We show that exclusive membership leads to superior outcomes than open membership and that unanimity voting is preferable to majority voting in welfare and environmental terms. Our results suggest restricting membership in future international environmental agreements and they provide a rationale for unanimity voting as applied in many international organizations.     

SECRETARY OF STATE MARSHALL,GENERAL CLAY,AND THE MOSCOW COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING OF 1947: A RESPONSE TO PHILIP ZELIKOW

This commentary challenges the major conclusion of a 1997 article which appeared in this journal. There, Philip Zelikow argued that previous treatments of the Council of Foreign Ministers 1947 meeting in Moscow erred in their characterization of the role of US Secretary of State Marshall. Earlier studies, in Zelikow’s view, failed to understand that Marshall, refusing to be constrained by the recently announced containment policy, made a serious effort to meet Soviet demands for reparations from current German output. It is contended here that a review of the evidence, especially materials from the John Foster Dulles papers and from British archives, does not support Zelikow’s conclusion.