A political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution

We present a two-country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor. Migration can be exogenous and/or endogenous (i.e., determined by labor income differentials). Political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups, where the latter can be affected by immigration. We show that immigration can increase the transfers to, and the income of, the mobile group. We also investigate the possibility of migration regulation, tax-transfer policy competition and coordination and, finally, coordination of regulation policies. It is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries.

     

The ruthless Fed: A critique of the AST hypothesis

This paper examines the hypothesis that the Great Contraction was the result of rational rent-seeking by members of the Federal Reserve System. In contrast to the AST hypothesis, evidence on the share prices of member banks that survived the contraction suggests that the owners of these banks suffered an absolute decline in real wealth and a decline relative to a broad spectrum of other investment alternatives. Furthermore, monetary surprises had no statistically discernible effect on the share prices of these banks. This evidence conflicts with the notion that rational rent-seeking would lead the owners of member banks and their bureaucratic conspirators in the Federal Reserve System to unleash a policy with the goal of contracting the money supply by 35 percent.     

CHANGING PRACTICES AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN URBAN GOVERNMENT: THE GREATER BRISBANE EXPERIENCE

Abstract: Since the commencement of the Greater Brisbane scheme in 1925, a number of different ways of organising the executive function have been provided for in the legislation. These have included a mayor elected at large as chief executive officer; an appointed city manager model, which was never activated; a quasi-cabinet model, with the mayor being elected by the council rather than at large; a "weak" collective executive committee, akin to the early 20th century "board of control" arrangements in Canada, the mayor being elected at large and standing committees of council possessing substantial policy formulation powers; a stronger collective executive in theory, alongside which something akin to the American "strong mayor with chief administrative officer" model operated in practice; a strong collective executive, with the mayor once again elected indirectly, and weak standing committees of aldermen retained; a return to something like the original mayor-as-CEO arrangement; and finally, a strengthened version of the initial "mayor-as-CEO with chief administrative officer" model. These changes are traced chronologically and a general assessment is offered in conclusion.     

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies.An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.     

Neighborhood Disadvantage, Individual Economic Distress and Violence Against Women in Intimate Relationships

A continuing debate in sociological criminology involves the association of crime with economic disadvantage at both aggregate and individual levels of analysis. At the aggregate level, data from law enforcement sources suggest that rates of intimate violence are higher in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Disadvantaged neighborhoods may experience higher rates of intimate violence for compositional or contextual reasons, or rates may only appear to be higher because of differential reporting. Similarly, at the individual level, intimate violence appears more common among couples that are economically distressed, but whether economic distress triggers intimate violence is not certain. Using data from waves 1 and 2 of the National Survey of Families and Households and from the 1990 U.S. Census, we investigate the effects of neighborhood economic disadvantage and individual economic distress on intimate violence against women. Controlling for violence at time 1 and other individual level characteristics, we find that neighborhood economic disadvantage, neighborhood residential instability, male employment instability, and subjective financial strain influence the likelihood of violence at time 2. The relationship between neighborhood disadvantage and intimate violence appears to reflect both compositional and contextual effects.     

Industry-specificities and size of corporations: determinants of ownership structures

This paper analyses ownership concentration in six European countries and empirically studies the rent-seeking theory. This theory states that ownership concentration not only depends on the level of investor protection but also on company-specific and industry-specific parameters. This study analyses the sector-specific ownership patterns of listed corporations. The results only partially confirm the influence of industry-specific characteristics. Different industries are characterized by different shareholder concentration patterns. Hence, and in light of the rent-seeking theory, it is plausible that company's specific characteristics, like the identity of the largest shareholder, the risk of the firm, etc. influence rent-seeking behavior.