Utility of the Y-STR typing systems Y-PLEX 6 and Y-PLEX 5 in forensic casework and 11 Y-STR haplotype database for three major population groups in the United States

The Y-PLEX 6 and Y-PLEX 5 systems enable analysis for 11 Y-STR loci. We present here the utility of these systems in forensic casework. A total of 188 samples, including 127 evidence samples, were analyzed using either or both of the systems. The evidence sample types included fingernail scrapings, sperm or seminal fluid, epithelial cells, blood and other tissues. The Y-STR typing systems provided useful probative results in difficult cases. A reference database for Caucasian (n = 517), African American (n = 535), and Hispanic (n = 245) population groups within the United States was generated for estimating the haplotype frequency in forensic casework. Among the individuals profiled, 311 Caucasians, 412 African Americans, and 194 Hispanics provided unique profiles in their respective population datasets. This is the first report describing the haplotype database for the set of 11 Y-STR loci recommended by the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM). Linkage analysis reveals that the frequencies from forensically important autosomal loci can be multiplied with the Y-STR haplotype frequency. The results from Y-PLEX systems have been accepted in courts in the United States.     

The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy Regulation on US Business Practice

Contemporary critiques of globalisation processes often focus on the potential levelling of regulatory standards and the export by the United States of neoliberal norms of deregulation and market facilitation. This paper, in contrast, examines the extra-jurisdictional impact of EU regulatory policy on the behaviour of foreign private parties, even in powerful states such as the United States. Shaffer finds that the threat of curtailing access to the EU's large market provides the EU with leverage. By acting collectively, EU Member States can magnify the impact of European policy on US business practice and enhance EU Member State clout in the negotiation of de jure and de facto foreign standards. The site of analysis is the current dispute between the United States and the European Union over the provision of 'adequate' data privacy protection in accordance with the EU Directive on data privacy. The paper explores the many ways in which the Directive affects US practice through changing the stakes of US players – including regulators, businesses, privacy advocates, lawyers and privacy service providers – and thereby shifting the playing field in the United States on which competing interest groups clash. In examining the interaction of EU law, US practice and international trade rules, the author finds that WTO law, rather than constraining the Directive's extra-jurisdictional impact, provides the EU with a shield against US retaliatory threats, thereby facilitating a trading up of data privacy standards. The paper concludes by examining the conditions under which cross-border exchange can lead to a leveraging up of social protections: the desire for firms to expand their markets, Member States' collective bargaining power buttressed by market clout, the nature of luxury goods, the externalities of foreign under-regulation legitimising EU intervention, and the constraints of supranational trade rules.     

Infinitely repeated contests: How strategic interaction affects the efficiency of governance

Contests over the scope and strength of regulation and governance are commonplace – and commonly repeated. The same players vie for the same government prize year after year: for example, environmental standards, government contracts, research grants, and public good provision. The open question is whether more rents are dissipated in repeated regulatory contests than onetime competitions. This question matters for regulation and governance because societies should design policies to waste the fewest scarce resources. According to some, the answer is “no”, but others say “yes”– more resources are wasted when people compete repeatedly for the same government prize. Herein, we use two game theoretic equilibrium concepts to help untangle the answer. Our results suggest non‐myopic contestants are more likely to behave as partners than rivals – provided the context is relatively sterile. Several common complications help break up the tacit partnership, including a disparity in relative ability, a shrinking prize, and additional players.