Parliamentary questions as a control mechanism in coalition governments

This article argues that government parties can use parliamentary questions to monitor coalition partners in order to reduce agency loss through ministerial drift. According to this control logic, government parties have particular incentives to question ministers whose jurisdictions display high policy conflict and high electoral salience and thus hold the prospect of electorally damaging ministerial drift. Multivariate regression analysis of all parliamentary questions in the German Bundestag between 1980 and 2017 supports this hypothesis, showing that cabinet parties address substantially and significantly more questions to ministries held by coalition partners on salient and ideologically divisive issues. This interactive effect does not occur for opposition parties or questions posed to own-party ministers. These findings, as well as the temporal patterns of questioning over the electoral cycle, indicate that control within coalitions is a distinct motivation for questioning ministers that cannot be reduced to existing explanations such as electorally motivated issue competition.     

Elections in Western European parliaments

Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.     

Exit,voice, and loyalty: Parent–child relations in the proto-industrial household economy (Zürich, 17th–18th centuries)

This article formulates a simple model of parent–child interest conflicts. Based on a simple model of a household economy with a production or wage income function, a labor maintenance cost function, and an externally given wage rate, it discusses potential conflicts over the appropriation of the product of family members' labor in terms of the trilogy of exit, voice, and loyalty. The model is then explored by using household lists that provide detailed information on the economic activity of individuals. Many young proto-industrial workers used the threat of exiting their parents' household to keep much of their earnings through the Rast custom (boarding allowance). The threat of leaving operated well among the middle and lower classes of proto-industrial society, but it is unclear whether it also worked for the daughters of farmers who apparently left home much earlier than their brothers. The discourse of contemporaries about the Rast custom are considered and interpreted as a counterstrategy against the exit threat in which the elders fostered a sense of loyalty among the young.     

Die Mitunternehmer-GesBR nach geltendem und künftigem Recht

Im ABGB-Jubil?umsjahr wird ua über eine Reform des GesBR-Rechts nachgedacht, das eine Erneuerung auch in der Tat bitter n?tig hat. Die folgenden überlegungen dienen einer vorbereitenden Bestandsaufnahme in Bezug auf solche (Au?en-)Gesellschaften bürgerlichen Rechts, die auf den Betrieb eines Unternehmens gerichtet sind. Denn diese Sonderform der Mitunternehmer-GesBR, deren Vertretung durch das HaR?G neu geregelt wurde (§ 178 UGB), ist bislang in der Literatur weit weniger diskutiert worden als die "Stammform" der (Zivil-)GesBR.