Welfare Implications of User Innovation

Innovation by users is now understood to be an important part of innovative activity in the economy. In this paper we explore the implications of adding innovation by users to existing models of social welfare that currently assume innovation by manufacturers only. We find this addition removes several inefficiencies, and that social welfare is likely to be increased by the presence of user innovation. Implications for policies that can impact users' freedom to innovate are discussed.     

Political strategies of large companies and their significance for the implementation of the European single electricity market: the examples of France and Germany

Electricity supply in the European member states has been a closed national public sector service without competition for a long time. Currently, the European electricity industry is subject to radical change resulting from the European directive establishing common rules for the internal market in electricity, which came into force in 1997. This paper attempts to explain the varying forms of implementation of the internal electricity market in France and Germany. First, it clarifies the special characteristics of electricity supply and European electricity policy. Secondly, the paper shows the divergent sectoral arrangements of the French and German electricity industries. Thirdly, it points out that the different degrees of linkage between the public players and the electricity companies in France and Germany produce different political strategies which are followed by the companies at the European level, especially those strategies which seek direct influence on the European Commission. Finally, the paper reveals the significance of these strategies in Brussels in terms of the implementation of the single electricity market in both member states. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

Implementing Democratic Equality in Political Parties: Organisational Consequences in the Swedish and the German Pirate Parties

This article theorises and empirically assesses some important intra‐organisational implications of maximising democratic equality in political parties both between followers and members and between members and elites. They include weak member commitment, passivity of the rank‐and‐file membership and – depending on party structure – high levels of internal conflict. To substantiate the arguments, two parties that implement principles of democratic equality in their organisations are examined: the Swedish and German Pirate parties. These cases show, first, that while organisational structures implementing norms of equality allowed them to rapidly mobilise a considerable following, the same structures systematically reduced their capacity to consolidate support in the longer term – a weakness that might eventually put these parties' survival at risk. Second, they show that differences in the extent to which subnational units provide a foundation for member mobilisation helps to explain variation in the level of internal conflict experienced by these parties.     

Corporate governance in Germany: The changing role of the banks

The article analyses the different channels ‐ industrial stakes, supervisory board mandates, proxy voting ‐ by which German banks can exert influence on industrial companies. The central thesis is that even where the banks have such influence they do not dominate the companies. A recent empirical study on the effects of the alleged bank dominance over industrial companies with detrimental effects on their performance is shown to contain major methodological mistakes. The relationship between banks and industry is undergoing some distinct changes. Banks have substantially reduced their industrial stakes as well as their representation on supervisory boards, which underlines that they are not striving for industrial leadership. Despite a clear trend in the German corporate sector to pay increasing attention to shareholder value and to provide more transparency in accounting, it seems premature to expect the German capital market, including the corporate governance system, to incorporate fully the Anglo‐Saxon model in the immediate future.     

Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary

Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami.     

War Crimes Prosecution in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-2002): An Analysis through the Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Chamber

The authors examine the efforts to bring persons suspected ofwar crimes committed during the 1992–1995 war in Bosniaand Herzegovina (BiH) to justice before the national judiciary.The analysis is based on the case law of the Human Rights Chamberfor BiH, which from 1996–2003 was the highest court competentto adjudicate violations of human rights in post-war BiH. TheChamber heard complaints linked to war-time atrocities fromtwo main perspectives: (i) that of persons put on trial forwar crimes and (ii) the perspective of the relatives of war-crimesvictims complaining about the failure to investigate and prosecute.The Chamber cases establish that (a) the few prosecutions whichtook place were nearly exclusively directed against suspectsbelonging to the war-time adversary, (b) the authorities failedto comply with the Rules of the Road (a procedure put in placeto enable the International Criminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia (ICTY) to supervise Bosnian war-crimes prosecutions)and (c) suspects were often severely ill-treated to extort confessionsand denied a fair trial. The rule, however, was the lack ofany investigatory or prosecutorial action, with the exceptionof the so-called ‘ethnically mixed’ Cantons of theFederation of BiH, where proceedings were sometimes initiatedbut failed to yield an appreciable outcome. The authors discussthree reasons for the poor record: (i) ethnic bias among theauthorities, (ii) disempowerment and passivity of the victimsand (iii) failure to enact legislation that would give effectto and clarify the BiH side of the obligation to exercise jurisdictionconcurrently with the ICTY. They finally set forth some suggestionson lessons to be learned for future attempts to bring justiceto a war-torn society by the concurrent exercise of criminaljurisdiction by an international court and the judiciary ofthe country in transition.