Enhancing the effectiveness of international development: a systems approach

Every day 25,000 people die of hunger and hunger-related causes. While it is recognised that the international development system is not as effective as it should be, years of endeavours to achieve greater harmonisation of international aid and to create an effective architecture pass by without adequate results. The article introduces a framework for enhancing the effectiveness of the international development system, based on fundamental concepts of Systems Thinking. It discusses the complex systemic challenges to development and suggests that more effective control is a key precondition for greater effectiveness in development as a whole.     

Starker Steuerwettbewerb – starke Reformen? Ein neuer Blick auf Unternehmenssteuerreformen in 15 EU‐Staaten (1998‐2011)

Although many EU‐countries have reduced corporate taxes in the recent years, there is still a substantial variance between the 12 oldest EU‐member states. This contribution revisits this variation and analyses the determinants of corporate tax reforms and their magnitude from a perspective which is new in two respects: First, we combine logistic panel regression and fsQCA analysis allowing for an integration of qualitative assessments of tax reforms in the QCA analysis. This adds to the existing studies on tax reform which almost exclusively rely on regression techniques. Second, we focus on the time period 1998‐2011 where we expect tax competition to be especially intense. The results of our analyses confirm the major impact of tax competition on national corporate tax policies. This relationship dominates the regression analyses as well as the fsQCA. Furthermore, our findings allow nuancing the existing results on the influence of institutional constraints and partisan politics.     

A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies

This article analyzes the system developed within Europe, more precisely within the European Union through European Community law, to address the security-sensitive issues involved in the export of hardware, software, and knowledge for the purpose of space activities and major space applications. The subject is introduced with reference to the far better known export control developments within the United States, such as those concerning International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the international understandings under the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement. European Community Regulations for export controls provide for a complex system of balances between national sovereignty and Europe-wide harmonization. This European Community regime, though ultimately still dependent upon individual state's sovereign controls, establishes an interesting measure of international harmonization in security-sensitive export controls. Although the European Community regime is fraught with many complexities, it manages to avoid some of the pitfalls evident in the United States and international regimes, notably the confusing discussions on discerning weaponry proper from other space items with dual-use potential. This is the result mainly of an approach characterized by a primary intention to harmonize, rather than to apply strict controls per se, resulting in a transparency and consistency that are not only valuable to commercial entrepreneurs, but also to those concerned primarily with the security risks posed by the international space industry. As for the space industry in particular, it is helpful that the European Community regime specifically carves out civil space activities, for example if conducted within the context of the European Space Agency or national space agency activities.     

Comparative Politics,Policy Analysis and Governance ‐ A European Contribution to the Study of the European Union?

Policy‐Making in the European Union. Fourth edition. Edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp.xxvi + 610, 32 figures, 21 boxes, 45 tables, 2 appendices, bibliography, index. £17.99 (paper) ISBN 0–19–878242‐X.

The Political System of the European Union. By Simon Hix. London: Macmillan, 1999. Pp.xx + 427, 53 tables, 28 figures, appendix, bibliography, index. £49.50 (cloth) ISBN 0–333–71653–1; £16.99 (paper) ISBN 0–333–71654‐X.

Decision‐Making in the European Union. By John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. London: Macmillan, 1999. Pp.xvi + 336, 52 boxes, 16 tables, bibliography, index. £47.50 (cloth) ISBN 0–333–60491–1; £15.99 (paper) ISBN 0–333–60492‐X.

The Transformation of Governance in the European Union. Edited by Beate Kohler‐Koch and Rainer Eising. London: Routledge, 1999. Pp.xvi + 320, 7 tables, 2 figures, bibliography, index. £60 (cloth) ISBN 0–415–21548‐X.

Theories of European Integration. By Ben Rosamond. London: Macmillan, 2000. Pp.xiii + 232, 5 tables, 1 figure, bibliography, glossary, index. £42.50 (cloth) ISBN 0–333–64716–5; £13.99 (paper) ISBN 0–333–64717–3.     

Parliamentary questions as a control mechanism in coalition governments

This article argues that government parties can use parliamentary questions to monitor coalition partners in order to reduce agency loss through ministerial drift. According to this control logic, government parties have particular incentives to question ministers whose jurisdictions display high policy conflict and high electoral salience and thus hold the prospect of electorally damaging ministerial drift. Multivariate regression analysis of all parliamentary questions in the German Bundestag between 1980 and 2017 supports this hypothesis, showing that cabinet parties address substantially and significantly more questions to ministries held by coalition partners on salient and ideologically divisive issues. This interactive effect does not occur for opposition parties or questions posed to own-party ministers. These findings, as well as the temporal patterns of questioning over the electoral cycle, indicate that control within coalitions is a distinct motivation for questioning ministers that cannot be reduced to existing explanations such as electorally motivated issue competition.     

Elections in Western European parliaments

Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.