Unemployment and crime: the role of apprehension

An increase in the unemployment rate decreases the opportunity cost of crime and increases the crime rate according to standard microeconomics models. However, a large body of empirical research has shown that an increase in unemployment may increase or decrease crime. By incorporating the return to crime into standard economic models, this paper shows that an increase in unemployment, as in recessions, decreases the opportunity cost of crime and the return to crime as well. As a result, the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and depends on the apprehension rate. An increase in the unemployment rate tends to decrease the crime rate at lower apprehension rates, but to increase it at higher apprehension rates. An increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits does not necessarily reduce the crime rate, and the effect of more generous unemployment insurance on crime depends again on the apprehension rate.     

构建预防情事变更原则滥用的民行检察监督机制

情事变更原则作为合同权利义务严重失衡的衡平机制,固然有其积极作用,却伴生权利可能被滥用的弊端.针对法院适用情事变更原则的民事裁判,必须构建高效的外部监督制衡机制,以防止合同权利及审判权力的滥用.目前学界均以情事变更原则的合理性为立论基点.以情事变更原则内生的法律风险为立论基点,以检察监督为载体,强化对法院的裁判监督制衡机制,以保障情事变更原则的正确施行.