Economic Threats or Societal Turmoil? Understanding Preferences for Authoritarian Political Systems

Why do some individuals prefer to be governed in an authoritarian political system? One intuitive answer is that citizens prefer authoritarian rule when the economy and society are in turmoil. These are common explanations for democratic backsliding, and the emergence and success of authoritarian leaders in the twentieth century. Which of these explanations better explains preferences for authoritarian rule? Both types of threat coincide in small samples and high-profile cases, creating inferential problems. I address this by using three waves of World Values Survey data to look at individual-level preferences for different forms of authoritarian government. Using multiple macroeconomic and societal indicators, I find that economic threats, especially increasing income inequality, better explain preferences for authoritarian government. I conclude with implications for understanding the emergence of support for authoritarianism in fledgling democracies.     

Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,Ruling of February 8, 2001, No. 15-O

In Nal' chik they are estimating the losses caused at residences during an attack by fighters and are replacing glass in the buildings in the Iskozh neighborhood, located near the third city division of internal affairs, where the fighters held hostages for more than a day.     

Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,Determination of October 3, 2002, No. 233-O

A group of members of the Public Chamber adopted a petition addressed to the parliament. It contains a proposal to improve the legislation in the sphere of countering extremist activity.     

Why Have Chinese Reforms Come to a Halt? The Political Economic Logic of Unfinished Transformation

This study approaches the Chinese reform process from a political-economic point of view, focusing primarily on institutional changes. Besides revealing the main factors behind the different phases of the reforms, it argues that in the framework of the current authoritarian regime, vested interests work against the continuation of the reforms, making it impossible to fully establish the institutional framework of a market economy. Current rents and privileges also deter the elite from implementing serious political reforms, leading to a trap that prevents the completion of the transition process.