INFORMAL CONTROL AND ILLICIT DRUG TRADE*

Antidrug legislation and enforcement are meant to reduce the trade in illegal drugs by increasing their price. Yet the unintended consequence is an increase in informal control—including retaliation, negotiation, avoidance, and toleration—among drug users and dealers. Little existing theory or research has explored the connections between informal control and drug trading. This article uses the rational choice and opportunity perspectives to explore the question: How and why does the frequency and seriousness of popular justice—as a whole or for each form—affect the price and rate of drug sales? The proposed theory is grounded on and illustrated with qualitative data obtained from drug dealers. This article concludes by discussing the scholarly and policy implications.     

SELF‐CONTROL AND VICTIMIZATION: A META‐ANALYSIS

A consequential development in victimization theory and research was the idea that individuals with low self‐control self‐select into the various risky behaviors that may ultimately result in their victimization. To establish the empirical status of the self‐control–victimization link, we subjected this body of work to a meta‐analysis. Our multilevel analyses of 311 effect size estimates drawn from 66 studies (42 independent data sets) indicate that self‐control is a modest yet consistent predictor of victimization. The results also show that the effect of self‐control is significantly stronger when predicting noncontact forms of victimization (e.g., online victimization) and is significantly reduced in studies that control directly for the risky behaviors that are assumed to mediate the self‐control–victimization link. We also note that the studies assessing self‐control and victimization are not representative of victimization research as a whole, with intimate partner violence (IPV), violence against women, and child abuse being severely underrepresented. We conclude that future research should continue to examine the causal processes linking self‐control to victimization, how self‐control shapes victims’ coping responses to their experience, and whether self‐control matters in contexts where individuals may have limited autonomy over the behavioral routines that put them at risk for victimization.     

THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN CONTEXT: EXPLORING THE MODERATING ROLES OF NEIGHBORHOOD DISADVANTAGE AND CULTURAL NORMS

Although the cycle of violence theory has received empirical support (Widom, 1989a, 1989b), in reality, not all victims of child physical abuse become involved in violence. Therefore, little is known regarding factors that may moderate the relationship between abuse and subsequent violence, particularly contextual circumstances. The current investigation used longitudinal data from 1,372 youth living in 79 neighborhoods who participated in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN), and it employed a multivariate, multilevel Rasch model to explore the degree to which neighborhood disadvantage and cultural norms attenuate or strengthen the abuse–violence relationship. The results indicate that the effect of child physical abuse on violence was weaker in more disadvantaged communities. Neighborhood cultural norms regarding tolerance for youth delinquency and fighting among family and friends did not moderate the child abuse–violence relationship, but each had a direct effect on violence, such that residence in neighborhoods more tolerant of delinquency and fighting increased the propensity for violence. These results suggest that the cycle of violence may be contextualized by neighborhood structural and cultural conditions.     

Capital Blight? The Regulation of Financial Institutions in Italy and Canada

The pressures of globalization and capital flight create two sets of challenges for national state structures. They are seen fo limit the boundaries of state action, and within those boundaries, they lead to a transfer of regulatory capacity to supra and/or subnational structures. The article explores the second set of challenges and asks whether globalization has led to uniform changes in the regulatory capacity of national states in the area of financial institutions. It argues that the Italian and Canadian experiences suggest that political and institutional factors may shape how national states respond to the pressure to shift regulatory capacity to structures at some other level. In the Italian case, the emergence of a single market for banking in Europe led to a strengthening of the state's policymaking capacity. In Canada, on the other hand, the federal government's authority was limited by competition with provincial regulatory regimes. Globalization may limit the boundaries of state action, but this does not necessarily mean that those boundaries will not be occupied primarily by national state structures.     

CITY RULES OK? POLICY COMMUNITY,POLICY NETWORK AND TAKEOVER BIDS

This paper uses the concepts of policy community and policy network to analyse the particular set of industrial policy issues related to the conduct of takeover and merger bids. Within the general context of the law, the regulatory climate is governed by the principle of voluntary self-regulation, which since 1968 has been partly articulated in a written code whose rules are interpreted and enforced by a non-statutory body, the City Takeover Panel. The panel is one of several 'insider' organizations identified and categorized in terms of policy community. Relationships between it and other 'insiders' in the policy processes are analysed in terms of policy network and 'rules of the game'. It is argued that the stability of that network is increasingly threatened by the environmental turbulence provoked by the Guinness affair and the passage of the 1986 Financial Services Act.     

JUVENILE INVOLVEMENT IN OCCUPATIONAL DELINQUENCY*

Although concern with white‐collar crime has grown considerably in recent years, little research has been undertaken on the workplace misconduct of juveniles. This omission is noteworthy because of the extensive involvement of youths in the labor market. Accordingly, based on a sample of high school seniors, we explored the determinants of youths' occupational delinquency. The analysis revealed that work‐related delinquency is affected both by underlying criminal propensities and by contact with delinquent coworkers on the job. It also appears that delinquent youths are selected into negative work environments in which they come into contact with fellow delinquents—an interaction effect that amplifies their occupational delinquency. Finally, the data suggest that associating with delinquent coworkers affects misbehavior not only within, but also outside the workplace. The theoretical implications of these findings are explored.