Mass incarceration: ‘a sin against the future’?

Conclusion The move towards incarceration as the response to all social problems is serious for all the reasons given above. It constitutes negative investment in the future and gives a frightening legitimacy to that vision of the society of the future that sees the population divided into three, one third living a comfortable life but behind fortifications, one third incarcerated in some form of camp or ghetto and the other third guarding the homes of the comfortable or working as prison personnel. The 20th century has not had a very good record on incarceration. It has seen Hitler’s concentration camps and Stalin’s Gulag. Nils Christie and other commentators talk already of the US gulag. In Western Europe, still, these are but trends. Imprisonment rates are still generally, except for those of the UK, lower than 100 per 100,000. The punitive and exclusionary attitudes prevalent in the US are not so deeply embedded in European traditions. A philosophy of re-integration into society for offenders still underpins legislation and practice. A philosophy of social cohesion governs institutions. The assumption is that offenders, although they must undergo criminal sanctions and pay back in some way for what they have done, keep their citizenship and must be welcomed back into society. These beliefs are part of European democratic ideals. Much energy will need to be put into supporting and maintaining them in penal policy in the years ahead.     

State of the Art: Addressing the INGO 'Legitimacy Deficit'

While the numbers and competencies of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have increased dramatically in the past few decades, questions have been raised about the legitimacy of their new activities. A number of scholars have identified significant tensions between INGOs' legitimacy claims and the realities of their working practices. We examine the current state of the debate on INGO legitimacy in two contrasting literatures: normative work on global governance and its implications for the role of INGOs, and policy-oriented work on INGOs' legitimacy. The first shows how INGO involvement in global governance opens the door to a range of alternative conceptions of world order, rooted in notions of universal human rights, democracy, and theories of redistributive justice. The latter set of voices is concerned less with locating INGOs' roles as agents in global normative structures than with analysing concrete problems arising from increased INGO participation in the development process. Future research might take into account key questions concerning the sources and the scope and nature of INGO legitimacy.     

The Techno-Economic: Perspectives for Analysis and Intervention

This paper compares the macro- and micro- analyses of techno-economic change. Arguing for perspectives which are sensitive to the local flexibility of innovation but which can also provide suggestions for policy and intervention, it describes and reviews the two major contributions: work on Techno-Economic Networks, and on Techno-Economic Paradigms. It is argued that the former has greater depth of analytical sensitivity, whilst the latter is more policy-relevant. Whilst there are approaches, such as Constructive Technology Assessment, which attempt to combine the two perspectives, these are seen as failing to retain sensitivity to the power differentials between key actors such as firms, experts, governing agencies or citizens' groups. The paper concludes by advocating attention to the ‘meso-level techno-economic’—the networks of institutions and actors at work in: geographically bounded systems of innovation; scientific and technological disciplines; firms, their strategies and linkages; and the nexus between production and consumption.     

On The Odiousness of Greek Debt

Unlike the popular narrative, which suggests that the Greek debt crisis was the result of lavish spending, this article demonstrates that the ‘crisis’ was generated by a transformation of purely private debt into public debt. This finding is supported by the preliminary report of the Greek Parliamentary Committee on the Truth of the Greek Debt, which clearly showed that the exponential increase of private debt in Greece risked the collapse of the private financial institutions exposed to it, namely Greek, French and German banks. This resulted in pressure on the Greek government to recapitalise and nationalise Greek banks through Eurozone and IMF funding. This funding, which came to be known as ‘bailout for Greece’ was nothing more than the rescue of private banks through EU taxpayers' money, only 5% of which went into the Greek economy. The article shows that the process by which the debt was transformed, as well as the post‐crisis bailout were odious, illegal and illegitimate and the ensuing debt itself was unsustainable and wholly against fundamental human rights.