Interest in political campaigns: The influence of question order and electoral context

A split-ballot experiment shows that, when people are asked how interested they are in following political campaigns, their response depends not only on the order in which the question is asked, but also on the broader electoral context in which it is posed. When asked how interested they were in following the political campaigns immediatelyafter a question about whether or not they voted in the (1982) election, people were more likely to think they were interested in the campaign, especially if they claimed to have voted, than if they were asked about it immediatelybefore the question on whether or not they voted. This order effect, however, appears to depend onwhen the questions are asked. If asked within a few weeks after the election, there is little or no order effect. But later, as the memory of the campaign fades, the order of the questions makes a sizable difference in the results. This order effect also seems to be more pronounced among better-educated respondents, suggesting that they are more likely to feel pressured by a social norm to vote and to express an interest in political affairs, not only in real life, but in the survey interview as well. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for the design of the interview schedule used in the American National Election Studies.The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES81-11404).     

The voter as juror: Attributing responsibility for economic conditions

One assumption of Key's reward-punishment theory that has attracted comparatively little attention is that voters hold the incumbent party responsible for all manner of economic fluctuations. A brief review of the survey literature in economic voting indicates that this assumption is in need of revision. The handful of existing studies in political science on responsibility attribution suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity and a failure to develop a theory of the attribution process. This paper outlines a model of economic voting in which people act as intuitive jurors using various decision rules to evaluate the evidence surrounding the president's responsibility for national economic problems. The generalizability of the framework and directions for future research are discussed     

From IDA to IIROC: Has self-regulation in the Canadian investment industry evolved?

This article analyzes the enforcement practices of the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) and compares them with its predecessor, the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA). The study collected data from IIROC's tribunal cases decided between June 2008 and December 2019 and compared them with data on the IDA's enforcement of complaints from 1984 to 2008. The findings reveal no statistically significant difference in the fines imposed by the two regulatory bodies. Furthermore, IIROC has refrained from issuing lenient penalties such as retaking examinations/courses or mandating terms and conditions for offenders. The results also indicate no significant impact on the number or distribution of offense types committed in the industry over time. Most notably, the Ontario Securities Commission, the Canadian Securities Regulators, and the new Self-Regulatory Organization of Canada should consider these findings when formulating policies concerning the role of self-regulation in the financial markets.     

On economic values in policy analysis

Analyses of public policy are rooted in the economic theory of the private sector. How relevant is this approach to the public sector? Specifically, where the organization is generally viewed as a controlled variable it often exhibits the characteristics of an independent variable working to constrain the feasible solution space. An illustration of this phenomenon is discussed, using a state rehabilitation agency as the case in point. Conclusions of an analysis based mainly on maximizing the economic value of return on investment conflicted with the agency professional values of individualized client service. This external/internal value conflict led to the apparent inability of the agency to implement the study conclusions in the near term. The substance of this conflict is seen as the main problem facing many public administrators. Recognition of economic values as but one element of public agency analysis is suggested as an approach superior to sole concentration on maximization of the return on public investment. By taking a broader view, the analyst may be able to encourage more rapid implementation of his recommendations.