STRAIN, PERSONALITY TRAITS, AND DELINQUENCY: EXTENDING GENERAL STRAIN THEORY

Although Agnew's (1992) general strain theory (GST) has secured a fair degree of support since its introduction, researchers have had trouble explaining why some individuals are more likely than others to react to strain with delinquency. This study uses data from the National Survey of Children to address this issue. Drawing on Agnew (1997) and the psychological research on personality traits, it is predicted that juveniles high in negative emotionality and low in constraint will be more likely to react to strain with delinquency. Data support this prediction.     

CLOSE‐UPS AND THE SCALE OF ECOLOGY: LAND USES AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL CONTEXT AND CRIME

Whereas one line of recent neighborhood research has placed an emphasis on zooming into smaller units of analysis such as street blocks, another line of research has suggested that even the meso‐area of neighborhoods is too narrow and that the area surrounding the neighborhood is also important. Thus, there is a need to examine the scale at which the social ecology impacts crime. We use data from seven cities from around the year 2000 to test our research questions using multilevel negative binomial regression models (N = 73,010 blocks and 8,231 block groups). Our results suggest that although many neighborhood factors seem to operate on the microscale of blocks, others seem to have a much broader impact. In addition, we find that racially and ethnically homogenous blocks within heterogeneous block groups have the most crime. Our findings also show the strongest results for a multitude of land‐use measures and that these measures sharpen some of the associations from social characteristics. Thus, we find that accounting for multiple scales simultaneously is important in ecological studies of crime.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

Developing Options for the Administration of Local Taxes: An International Review*

Do decentralization arguments extend to administration of subnational taxes? While centralized administration promises quality service at reasonable cost, it may dull accountability and slow the revenue flow. Also, central administration may devote less attention to collecting these taxes than for its own. Self‐administration brings administration closer to taxpayers and assures representation of jurisdictional interests in revenue apportionment disputes. However, subnational governments may lack technical capacity. That is the dilemma: while the central administration may be indifferent to rigorous collection of subnational taxes, subnational governments may lack capacity for self‐administration. In practice, nations use many different alternatives for administering subnational taxes.     

CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE DYNAMICS OF TRIADIC RELATIONSHIPS

The accession of the UK into the European Community in 1973 and the growth in power and competence of European institutions in subsequent years prompts a rethink of relationships between central and local governance. Rather than a dyadic process between two sets of bodies, the new triadic system is based on varying interactions between the three groups of actors at each level. The article develops six possible scenarios of new relationships which can be simplified into centralization, no change or decentralization. To appraise the nature of the changes, the article examines the operation of the European Regional Development Fund, the additionality controversy, lobbying over the 1994 reform of the structural funds and aspects of environmental regulation. Rather than one scenario dominating, the findings show several types of new relationships emerging.