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排序方式: 共有270条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
261.
Conventional analyses of Africa's failed statesconclude that patronage networks fragment as state resourcesdecline. As payoffs from rulers decline, once-loyal strongmenbecome warlords, attacking centralized authority. This articleexamines how rulers of weak states actually manage increasinglythreatening patronage networks. The cases of Angola and SierraLeone show how rulers use more reliable foreign mining firmsand foreign private (mercenary) armies to marginalize threateningstrongmen. At home, militarising commerce denies its benefitsto enterprising strongmen. Rulers then receive creditor financialsupport for their offensives against elements of their old patronagenetwork and insurgencies, seeming to battle corruption and inefficiency.Rulers discover that they can use foreign firms to collect revenue,defend territory and conduct diplomacy with other states andmultilateral agencies more reliably then domestic bureaucratsor strongmen whose political authority may threaten their own.This new political alliance increases the economic viabilityof some weak states. Paradoxically, the destruction of conventionalstate institutions eases the hard pressed ruler's efforts torecruit aid from global society and manage the demands of competitionin global markets. 相似文献
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WILLIAM RENO 《管理》1993,6(1):23-42
The International Monetary Fund imposes policy conditions upon Sierra Leone in exchange for loans. The country's president, however, shapes these policies into tools for his domestic struggle to control strongmen-politicians active in the informal (black) market. The president seeks political gain by manipulating creditor demands that he promote foreign in-vestment. This internal dynamic of "reform" does not accomplish creditors' public aims of supporting stronger state institutions. But creditors acquiesce in some of the president's manipulations of reforms when they generate arrears payments. Ironically, Sierra Leone's president proves able to translate creditor and foreign investor demands into political resources in his effort to bolster his extremely weak political authority. 相似文献
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WILLIAM B. GWYN 《Political studies》1971,19(4):383-402
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WILLIAM RODGERS 《The Political quarterly》1983,54(4):354-362
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WILLIAM R. KEECH 《管理》1992,5(3):259-278
Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government. 相似文献
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