‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010

When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.     

NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR - THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE

The article argues that one should look not only at attempts to reduce governmental regulation via privatization and deregulation, but also to pay attention to new modes of dispute-resolution in highly complex and controversial issues. Following an alleged 'crisis of regulatory policy', the authors discuss ways and means of negotiation and mediation in the public sector. Based on American approaches, the German experience is at the forefront of their interest. The systematic and at the same time empirically oriented analysis looks at 'alternative' ways to regulate through cooperative behaviour, evaluates attempts at unassisted and assisted negotiations as a means of conflict resolution, and sheds light on the necessary framework for the use of mediation policies and techniques. A careful optimism on the use of negotiation and mediation in public sector disputes prevails.     

Party organisation and party competitiveness: The case of the Austrian People's Party, 1945–1992

Abstract. This article links party organisation to party performance, examining their relationship over almost half a century in an in-depth case study of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). It proceeds from the assumption that party organisation does matter for party performance, at least indirectly, and that the adaptation of the party organisation to a changing environment is, in the long run, the only viable strategy for party goal achievement. While the ÖVP's environment was subject to important changes, all of which worked against the party, it has failed to adapt to them. This, in turn, has reduced the competitiveness of the ÖVP. Consequently its record in achieving most of its party goals has been rather poor since 1970. The reconstruction of the intra-party discussions reveals that the party leadership had access to analyses identifying the structural weaknesses of the party organisation since the late 1950s. The ÖVP's failure to adapt is explained by using the 'nested games' approach of Tsebelis (1990). In order to enhance the understanding of organisational dynamics of parties in a more general sense, the case of the ÖVP is related to the work of Panebianco (1988) and Janda (1990).     

THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY CHANGE: WBBYING AND WATER PRIVATIZATION

The privatization of the water industry was one of the most controversial and turbulent privatizations of the 1980s. The government undertook the project somewhat reluctantly, then the first plans had to be withdrawn, but eventually, the privatization of the industry was successfully completed in 1989. In this article, we first set out to provide a thorough account of the process of privatizing water, based on primary sources and exhaustive interviews. In doing so, we identity some major problems of established theories of British policy making: the process of water privatization clearly does not conform to any single model of policy making. Instead, individual 'episodes' of the policy process conform to different models. Arguing that existing theories of British policy making may have focused too narrowly on routine decision-making processes, we propose that a theory of the transformation of policy communities is required to understand the dynamics of radical policy change in Britain.     

Explaining near-universal turnout: The case of Malta

Abstract. Even though voting is not compulsory, Malta has the highest turnout of all democratic nations. This study examines characteristics of the Maltese electorate, the country's governmental institutions and electoral system, and the nature of its politics to identify the most powerful factors (or combination of factors) responsible for the high voter turnout. Among these are: (1) intense and pervasive partisanship; (2) concentration of political power in a single elective institution; (3) highly competitive elections resulting in one-party governments despite PR.; (4) maximization of the impact of a single ballot because the number of votes a candidate needs to be elected is very low and because the voter's lower-order preferences count under STV, and (5) unusually intense campaigning by individual candidates because they compete against other candidates of the same party, and by parties because the electorate is polarized, which leaves few uncommitted voters while rendering voter conversion unlikely, thus making mobilization of all existing supporters vital to electoral success.     

FROM THE EUROPEANIZATION OF LAWMAKING TO THE EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS: THE CASE OF AUSTRIA

This article addresses the scope of legal Europeanization with regard to Austria, a 1995 accession country. Depending on the choice among several plausible indicators of legal Europeanization, the relative impact of the EU varies greatly. The share of EU-related legislation peaked in the pre-accession period when most of the acquis communautaire needed to be adopted. In the membership period, legislation that relates to the EU accounts for almost 25 per cent of the enactments. Although government decrees outnumber laws as the means of transposition, EU-related rules constitute a much smaller share of delegated legislation. Collectively, EU-related rules constitute a tenth of Austrian legislation. Yet by mid-2003, 42 per cent of Austria's original laws—the core of its legislation—were related to EU rules. While falling short of some inflated expectations, legal Europeanization is indeed a major feature of Austrian legislation. The article confirms expectations derived from the political controversy of EU affairs, federalism, and legal traditions. When we refer to 'legal orders' in the article we mean the entire body of legislation in force; we use the term 'legislation' to refer to recent additions to the body of legislation.     

LEGAL EUROPEANIZATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

By mid-2003, the legal orders (the entire bodies of legislation in force) of three EU member states – Austria , Denmark, and The Netherlands – contained between 10.5 and 14.2 per cent of rules devoted to the transposition of EU directives. Only a few ministerial jurisdictions contain more than 20 per cent of Europeanized rules. The member states show remarkable differences in the use of parliamentary versus delegated legislation as a means of transposition. The comparison of the three cases tentatively suggests that different legal traditions and the parliamentary involvement in EU affairs are important factors that account for cross-national differences.     

Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe

Veto player theory generates predictions about governments’ capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments’ ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single‐country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid‐1980s until the mid‐2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis‐driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology‐driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.