The October Crisis of 1993: Context and Implications

An eminent British specialist on Russian politics analyzes the conflict between Boris Yel'tsin and his opponents that resulted in the bloody military showdown of October 3-4, 1993. Based upon materials gathered in Moscow during the events and on the author's personal observations and interviews, the article traces the origins and course of the wider conflict. It also interprets the implications of Yel'tsin's actions for the further development of democracy in Russia.     

Financial Discrepancies in Political Party Funding by Indonesian Local Government Authorities

Through different forms of decentralization variables, this study investigates Indonesian local government authorities' 2006 financial accountability reports in terms of local government authorities' contributing funds to political parties. Audit results by the Supreme Audit Body reveal that many articles were violated by these authorities in regard to the distributing, administrating, and reporting of assistance funds from them to political parties. Each rupiah committed by the 221 local government authorities involved in this study violated, on average, 1.8 articles, indicating a low level of compliance.

Critically, the study finds that administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization decreases discrepancies. The less administratively decentralized provincial authorities, where decision making is a level of government farther from the people, are more likely than non-provincial local government authorities to make discrepancies with political party legislation and regulations. Fiscally decentralized local government authorities, who earn a higher fraction of their revenue from local sources, also tend to have fewer discrepanciesFinally, politically decentralized authorities with a higher percentage of elected officials from the decentralized supporting ruling coalition, also have fewer discrepancies.     

A decade of decline: a longitudinal look at big city and big county strategies to cope with declining revenues

Many local governments have now endured a decade of fiscal decline due to periodic reductions in external funding (federal and state and slowdowns in the rate of growth of the state and local government sector. This research examines the extent to which six large jurisdictions (three cities, three counties) under fiscal duress avoided political conflict and prevented further fragmentation of their authority between 1978 and 1987. The results showed that local officials generally chose retrenchment strategies (revenue, expenditure, and borrowing) with the least anticipated political opposition; but where hard choices had to be made (personnel reductions), they were made without hesitation. The timing of politically unpopular choices to coincide with downward trends in the private sector reduced the level of political fallout, even in heavily unionized, socioeconomically diverse communities. The results also showed that local officials strongly endorsed, rather than opposed, strategies that further fragmented their authority (privatization, intergovernmental cooperative agreements), because these approaches produce significant personnel and capital savings in the short term. Finally, the results indicated that the long-term cumulative effects of short-term decremental decisionmaking on the quality of life (as measured by drops in bond ratings) were negative in only one-third of the jurisdictions.     

Books in Brief

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, HEGEMONY & SOCIALIST STRATEGY—TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (London: Verso, 1985), trans. by Winston Moore and Paul Cammack.

Chris Rojek, capitalism and leisure theory (London and New York: Methuen, 1985)

Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, education under siege—THE CONSERVATIVE, LIBERAL AND RADICAL DEBATE OVER SCHOOLING (South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1985).

Bertell Ollman and Edward Vernoff. THE LEFT ACADEMY: MARXIST SCHOLARSHIP ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES, VOLUME 1.

—THE LEFT ACADEMY: MARXIST SCHOLARSHIP ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES, VOLUME 2, (New York: Praeger, 1984).

Alam Blum and Peter McHugh. SELF REFLECTION IN THE ARTS AND SCIENCES, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1984).

Bottomore, Tom, with Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan, and Ralph Miliband. A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983)

Resnick, Stephen, and Richard Wolff, eds. rethinking marxism: Essays for Harry Magdoff & Paul Sweezy. (Brooklyn, New York: Au‐tonomedia, 1985).

Adam Przeworski, capitalism and social democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985)

Gosta Esping‐Andersen, politics against markets: the social democratic road TO power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)

CUBA: twenty‐five years of revolution—1959–1984 (New York: Praeger, 1985), edited by Sandor Halabsky and John M. Kirk.

Barry Barnes, about science (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985)     

Why might constructed nationalist and ethnic ideologies come into confrontation with each other?

The paper develops a model for examining ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia, using Indonesia as an illustrative case. Ethnic conflict is explained as arising not out of the facts of ethno-cultural pluralism, but rather out of the disentwining of the three visions of the nation: as civic community, as ethno-cultural community and as multicultural community.This disentwining occurs particularly in the context of pressures for democratization. Three aspects of politics are identified as promoting the disentwining so as to engender the weakening of the civic nationalist vision, and thence the confrontation between a majoritarian ethno-cultural nationalism and a minority-focused multicultural nationalism. First, the spread of ideas related to democracy generates the spread of liberal forms of the three nationalist visions, alongside the authoritarian forms, and puts the spotlight on the divergences between these visions. Ideas of democracy are then highjacked by ethnic majorities claiming majority rights, and by ethnic minorities claiming minority rights. Second, the patrimonial basis for politics in much of Southeast Asia means that ethnic majorities and minorities alike perceive democratization as the search for responsive patrons, rather than as the search for civic equality. Third, civic nationalism is further weakened by the erosion of faith in the social justice promises of state elites. While these features of politics promote ethnic tensions, they also generate countervailing factors that ensure the political disunity of ethnic minorities, and thereby inhibit the extent of ethnic conflict.     

Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes

In rendering a decision in a particular case, judges are not limited to finding simply for the appellant or for the respondent. Rather, in many cases, they have the option to find for the former on one or more issues and for the latter on one or more other issues. By thus “splitting the difference,” judges can render a judgment that favors both litigants to some degree. What accounts for such mixed outcomes? Several theoretical perspectives provide potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, Galanter (1974) suggests that litigants with greater resources will achieve more favorable outcomes in the courts. Where two high‐resource, repeat‐player litigants meet in the appeals courts, these more sophisticated and successful parties may be able to persuade the court to render decisions with mixed outcomes that at least partially favor each party. Second, split outcomes may result from strategic interactions among the appeals court judges on the decisionmaking panel. Where majority opinion writers seek to accommodate other judges on the panel, split outcomes have the potential to serve as an inducement for more ideologically extreme judges to join the majority opinion. Finally, Shapiro and Stone Sweet ( Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002 ) propose that courts will sometimes split the difference in order to enhance their legitimacy (and ultimately enhance compliance by losing parties). For example, in highly salient cases, where noncompliance would more clearly threaten court legitimacy, judges may be more likely to split the difference in order to mollify even the losing party. We develop an empirical model of mixed outcomes to test these propositions using data available from the U. S. Courts of Appeals Database and find evidence supportive of all three theoretical perspectives.