Managing the negotiation agenda

Conclusion The agenda is one of the main structural elements of negotiation, in addition to such questions as site, identification of participants, and elements of timing. Together, they answer the who, what, when, and where questions. As with other aspects of negotiation, the agenda can be used either manipulatively to enhance leverage or to improve the prospects for agreement and the possibilities for mutual gain. In most cases, it will be used both ways, reflecting the nature of negotiation as a mixed-motive situation.Although it can be instrumental to volunteer as a sole source to write the agenda, in most cases it becomes a joint activity to construct a consensual basis for subsequent negotiation. In these situations, agenda-building becomes one of the pre-negotiation activities that set the tone for the relationship (Saunders, 1985). In other situations, the parties may engage in actual negotiation without a formal or written agenda. When this occurs, the risks and uncertainties may be high but the party who appreciates the importance of the informal agenda has a tremendous advantage.Whether one plans it or not, during the course of negotiation the parties will discuss a finite set of issues in some sequence and from a particular perceptual framework. Consciousness of the universality and centrality of the agenda is prerequisite to guiding negotiation to a successful conclusion. William R. Pendergast is Associate Dean at Boston University's Metropolitan College, 755 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02215, where he teaches graduate courses and executive development seminars on negotiation. He is preparing research on power and influence, and on strategic choice in negotiation.     

The establishment of the presence and group classification of sperm in mixed stains by isoelectric focusing

The article deals with experimental data on design of the method used for detection of sperm, blood and vaginal secretions according to isoelectric points of acid phosphatases, differential diagnosis of ABO group antigens in "mixed" stains as well as detection of phenotype of red cell acid phosphatase by isoelectric focusing method.     

Work,fertility, and the status of women in Mexico

Among the major transformations affecting Mexican women in recent decades were their growing participation in the labor market and the fertility decline that began in the 1970s with widespread access to contraception. Data from 3 major Mexican fertility surveys, employment surveys, and censuses are used to analyze changes in female employment and their determinants during the years of economic recession in the 1980s. The main characteristics of the Mexican fertility decline are described, and the relationship between fertility and female employment before and during the economic recession is scrutinized for different social sectors. Suggestions for research on the affects of these changes on the social condition of Mexican women are then presented. The proportions of Mexican women over 12 years old who declared themselves economically active increased from 16% in 1970 to 21% in 1979 and 32% in 1987. Until the 1970s the majority of employed women were young and single or childless. But a clear increase occurred between 1976-87 in the economic participation of older women in union. Economic participation of low income and less educated women increased as they sought work or created their own in response to deteriorating living conditions during the recession. Young women with intermediate or higher educational levels did not increase their relative presence in the labor market in the same period. The marked increase in economic participation of less educated women in union with small children was accompanied by a significant increase in manual occupations. Between 1982-87, the proportion of women aged 20-49 in nonsalaried manual occupations rose from 7.6% to 18.5%. Mexico's fertility decline has been well documented. The total fertility rate declined from 6.3 in 1973 to 3.8 in 1986, while the percentage of women in union using a contraceptive method increased from 30.2 in 1976 to 52.7 in 1987. Fertility differentials have been declining but are still considerable. The inhibitory influence of children on female labor force participation in Mexico is clear, but in the years of economic recession the most notable increase in female workers was in women with 3 or more children of whom the youngest was under 3. It appears that the influence of children on women's employment depends on the socioeconomic status of the woman as well as on the dynamism or sluggishness of the labor market. Research is needed on the significance of changes in fertility and female employment for women's status in Mexico. Several recent works have presented results of microsocial analyses of the ways in which women experience changes in their lives resulting from fertility and employment decisions. A methodological strategy for studying these changes and their influence on women's status should focus on comparisons between different generations and birth cohorts, different types of employment, and different socioeconomic statuses. Both macrosocial and microsocial forms of analysis are needed to provide a full picture.     

Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry

The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve fair competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of unfair foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on Economics and Power organized by the FWS Institute of Zug and held at Interlaken, Switzerland in July 1988.