PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES,PUBLIC SERVANTS AND DUE PROCESS

Abstract: The parliamentary system of government in its Australian form has a number of unresolved problems, notwithstanding its many virtues. One such problem is that of the role of public servants when called before parliamentary committees as witnesses. The current guidelines are mainly advice to public servants as to how they should avoid or defer questions which neither the minister nor the departmental secretary has authorised them to answer. Of course, this is useful and proper within its limits. However, it fails to address many of the dilemmas and career-threatening choices which can face public servants who find themselves being questioned in an aggressive, hostile manner by members of a parliamentary committee. Unfair treatment of witnesses is not a trivial matter and there are more than isolated instances. This article deals with an episode involving the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts in 1982. The case is now some years in the past, but it is still worth examining for what it teaches about gaps in our constitutional conventions. At the end of the article we suggest action in four areas. Intensive training and retraining is needed, first in the upper ranks of the public service, and secondly for chairpersons and members of parliamentary committees. Thirdly there is a need for MAB-MIAC to revisit yet again their guidelines on accountability and to instigate a review of the government's guidelines for public servants appearing as witnesses. Both sets of guidelines are anachronisms. Finally, we suggest that, in any future review of government policy in this area, consideration be given to the amendment of relevant legislation to bring due process and the protection of witnesses more closely into line with the rights available to persons appearing before a court.     

EVERYONE'S DOING IT! CODES OF ETHICS AND NEW SOUTH WALES PARLIAMENTARIANS‘ PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

Abstract: Everyone is doing a code of ethics. But when can codes do good? To find out we interviewed New South Wales parliamentarians about their perceptions of corruption in 10 scenarios weighted from least to most corrupt. The cases were drawn from John Peters and Susan Welch's theory of corruption. We note similar studies in the United States and Canada. There is confusion about ethics, and we note that the episodes of corruption in the 1980s suggest ethical standards could be elevated. Perhaps the most significant conclusion is that parliamentarians come to think alike about corruption in the middle of their careers. Those who want to see ethics enhanced should aim at induction, education, and counselling within parliament. Here codes, if supported, have a role to play. Improvement will not be achieved by searching for a saintly parliamentarian. We found those most sensitive to corruption to be the least and most senior members.     

A transaction-based approach to policy intervention

A transaction-based approach to policy intervention is presented. The approach overcomes a number of weaknesses in current approaches to policy intervention. The approach involves three main conceptual elements: transactions, transaction governance mechanisms, and governance principles. The transaction is taken to be the basic unit of analysis. Profiles of transactions vary along a number of transaction dimensions. Transaction governance mechanisms - such as, for example, government service, regulation, contracts, vouchers, markets, taxes, and self-service - are each suitable for governing transactions having particular profiles. A mechanism will fail when used to govern transactions not fitting the profile. Governance principles are criteria or expectations - for example, efficiency, justice and liberty - used to judge how well a mechanism fulfills or achieves important societal goals. Specific choices of governance mechanisms (from the set that are technically feasible) therefore should be made according to how well they satisfy these governance principles. Public high school education is used as an example to illustrate the approach. A number of conclusions are offered.This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Public Administration Portland, Oregon, April, 1988.     

On the Design of Equalizing Grants

This article considers the design of grants to offset fiscaldisparities. We define a fiscal disparity as a condition inwhich towns must levy a different tax rate in order to providethe same level of public services. We consider ways of measuringdisparities, as well as ways of allocating grants to alleviatedisparities. In order to focus the presentation, we concentrateon lump-sum grants for unrestricted use from a state governmentto general purpose local governments within that state. We concludeby presenting an example of a grants formula for the state ofNew Jersey which meets our specifications.     

Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective

George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.