‘Indirect amendment’: how the federal department of justice unilaterally alters the text of the constitution of Canada

Since 1957, the Department of Justice of Canada has regularly altered the wording of some sections of the Constitution Act, 1867 in its consolidated versions of the Constitution of Canada, even though neither the Westminster Parliament nor the Parliament of Canada had ever amended these provisions themselves or delegated to the executive the authority to make changes on their behalf. The Department of Justice refers to its practice of altering the text of the Constitution of Canada as ‘indirect amendment’. However, since the Constitution Act, 1982 states categorically that the Constitution of Canada can only be validly amended through one of its five amending formulas, the Department of Justice’s technocratic approach to ‘indirect amendment’ is almost certainly unconstitutional.?Either the Department of Justice should restore the original wording of the text of these sections in its subsequent consolidations of the Constitution Acts and relegate the updated figures or other commentary to explanatory footnotes. Alternatively, the Parliament of Canada should update these sections itself, directly, as a Section 44 Constitutional Amendment. The rule of law depends upon following the Constitution of Canada's amendment procedures properly.     

The concept of desert and its influence on simulated decision makers' sentencing decisions

The concept of desert (the principle that punishment should be made proportional to the severity of the crime committed) is introduced against its philosophical and legal background. Discussion focuses on the role of desert in contemporary sentencing reform proposals and the relationship between desert and other goals of legal punishment. Previous empirical research has addressed a between-offense conception of desert and suggests proportionality does control individuals' responses to crimes differing in severity. Our research focuses on the operation of desert within offenses (or the balance of harm done and punishment deserved for the individual offender) within the context of crimes of increasing severity. Six experimental simulations varied the relativity of victim/offender suffering prior to sentencing. Results show that for a minor crime punishment is an inverse monotonic function of offender suffering, but for crimes of moderate and high severity only excessive offender suffering successfully mitigated punishment. The source of offender suffering made no difference, supporting earlier work by Kalven and Zeisel; suffering exerted no effect on conviction decisions. Overall results are viewed as demonstrating the influence of both within-and between-offense conceptions of desert and the importance of the symbolic and moral blame components of legal punishment.Work on this research was supported by a Russell Sage Foundation Law and Social Science Residency Fellowship awarded to the author. This paper is based in part on a paper delivered at the American Psychology-Law Society meetings, Chicago (1975). The author would like to thank Mary Kristine Utne, V. Lee Hamilton, and an anonymous reviewer for their many helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.