Uncertainty and political participation

The minimax regret model of decision making under uncertainty, which was proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) as a model of the voting decision, is here generalized to encompass forms of political participation (such as contributing money or time to a campaign) in which the range of alternatives is continuous. A principal implication of the model is that aggregate campaign contributions may be substantially increased by limiting the amount that any one individual can contribute. The conditions under which the behavior of a minimax regret decision maker can be unambiguously distinguished from that of an expected utility maximizer are also specified.     

Training prison inmates as paralegals: An experimental project

A program to train inmates as paralegals was established at a large state prison in the Midwest. Qualified inmates were randomly assigned to the training or to a control condition. Both groups were administered measures assessing legal knowledge, the use of legal knowledge, attitudes about the criminal justice system, and self-perceptions before and after training. The trainee group showed a significant increase in its amount of legal knowledge after training. Members of the trainee group also reported a significant increase in the number of other inmates requesting aid from them on legal problems. In addition, interviews were conducted with two random samples of the general inmate population, before and after the paralegal training program. These interviews revealed strong support for the training program, and this support increased over the period of the program. Limited data on longer-term effectiveness of the paralegal's performance in the prison legal aid clinic and in paralegal jobs following parole supported the positive, shorter-term results.     

Cost and the calculus of voting

Downs's (1957) theory of voting maintains that individuals balance the costs of voting against anticipated benefits in deciding whether to vote. However, most empirical tests of his theory have concluded that costs play little role in individuals' decisions to vote or abstain, and that benefits are the determining factor. Unfortunately, the existing empirical tests of the theory have been inadequate, especially in regard to the measurement of the cost of voting. Using data from the Comparative State Elections Project, we develop an improved indicator of the cost of voting. When this measure of cost is used in a test of Down's theory, we find, contrary to most earlier research, that the cost of voting seems to be a more important determinant of participation than the factors associated with voting benefits in Downs's model.The authors shared equally in the research reported; the order in which they are listed was determined randomly.