Risky business: A risk-based methodology to measure organized crime

This paper describes the result of two studies on the development of a methodology to measure organized crime. The purpose of these studies, tasked by the Belgian Federal Police and Minister for Justice, was to provide a concrete and knowledge-based framework for the drafting of annual reports on organized crime that can give better answers to questions like ‘Is there much organized crime? Is the situation serious? Is it bad that there are more criminal groups now than in the past? Which criminal groups are the most dangerous?’. Two features provide a common thread that binds the methodology: the operating principle of the spectrum of enterprise and the application of a risk-based methodological process to the overall framework. The starting hypothesis is that organized crime is entrepreneurial in nature and that the dynamics of the market space provide the main environment and explanation for organized crime. The application of a risk-based methodology is founded on the recognition that the analysis of organized crime will always depend on imperfect information and resource limitations. Furthermore, the utility of a risk-based approach is seen in the provision of findings that are transparently arrived at with a clearly established framework for prioritization of decision-makers. The proposed methodology consists of three parts: environmental scanning, analysis of organizations and counter strategies and licit and illicit sector analysis.     

Britannia waived the rules: The Major government and the 1994 Rwandan genocide

Ten years after the 1994 Rwandan genocide occurred, seriousquestions remain about the circumstances of the British government'sresponse. This article critically evaluates the response ofJohn Major's government to the genocide. It does so in fourstages. The first section provides a brief overview of the Majorgovernment's international agenda in 1994, focusing on Britishpolicy towards the war in Bosnia and the African continent ingeneral. The second section deals with the substance of Britain'sRwanda policy, while the third discusses the ways in which thispolicy has been almost totally omitted from mainstream accountsof this period. The final section provides a critical evaluationof some of the tactics that British officials employed to avertcriticism of their government's policies. Based on the evidencepresented we conclude that the British government displayeda deeply troubling indifference towards the victims of Rwanda'sgenocide.