Satisfaction with democracy and collective action problems: the case of the environment

Whether a country is able effectively to address collective action problems is a critical test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one particularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmental taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as pronounced. The evidence for the effect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling.     

Ingestion of pointed objects in a complex suicide

A 51-year-old woman with a psychiatric history of depression and drug abuse was found hanged in her bedroom. The ligature was a scarf attached to the door handle. The autopsy findings suggested that two methods of suicide had been used one after the other. In the first stage, numerous nails, pins and needles were swallowed; in the second stage, the suicide was completed by hanging.     

Accounting for Voter Heterogeneity within and across Districts with a Factor-Analytic Voter-Choice Model

José Afonso Mazzon Faculdade de Administração e Economia, University of São Paulo, Ave. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908, CEP 0558-900 São Paulo, Brazil. e-mail: jamazzon{at}usp.br e-mail: kamakura{at}duke.edu (corresponding author) In this study, we propose a model of individual voter behaviorthat can be applied to aggregate data at the district (or precinct)levels while accounting for differences in political preferencesacross districts and across voters within each district. Ourmodel produces a mapping of the competing candidates and electoraldistricts on a latent "issues" space that describes how politicalpreferences in each district deviate from the average voterand how each candidate caters to average voter preferences withineach district. We formulate our model as a random-coefficientsnested logit model in which the voter first evaluates the candidatesto decide whether or not to cast his or her vote, and then choosesthe candidate who provides him or her with the highest value.Because we allow the random coefficient to vary not only acrossdistricts but also across unobservable voters within each district,the model avoids the Independence of Irrelevant AlternativesAssumption both across districts and within each district, therebyaccounting for the cannibalization of votes among similar candidateswithin and across voting districts. We illustrate our proposedmodel by calibrating it to the actual voting data from the firststage of a two-stage state governor election in the Brazilianstate of Santa Catarina, and then using the estimates to predictthe final outcome of the second stage.     

Negative Issue Ownership

Existing research considers issue ownership to be a positive attribute of political parties, which are seen as ‘owning’ those policy areas where they are particularly competent and engaged. However, for some citizens a party may also be a negative issue owner if it has a particularly bad reputation for its handling of an issue. This article describes and explains aggregate and individual-level patterns of negative issue ownership using a survey-based measure of handling perceptions from the 2013 Austrian National Election Study (n = 3,266). Naming a particular party as a negative issue owner is affected by partisanship, but also by policy preferences and government performance evaluations. The effects of issue importance vary across issues. These findings lay the groundwork for more research on negative attributions of issue ownership and their empirical consequences on vote choice.