Governance plays a critical role in determining the success and failure of public–private partnerships (PPPs). We conducted a systematic review of case study literature on PPP governance and developed a governance framework consisting of 21 issues in four groups: institutional, organizational, contractual, and managerial. Then, we investigate the dynamics of governance issues, including the relative importance, interrelationships, and connections with PPP success and failure. Results suggest that PPPs should emphasize cooperation, trust, communication, capability, risk allocation and sharing, competition, and transparency in their governance. We also found that the governance practice of emphasizing dominant and direct factors and ignoring recessive and indirect ones has hindered PPPs’ success. 相似文献
Building from the interest-group theory of regulation, we posit that trust alters the payoff from regulatory rent-seeking relative to profit-seeking. Trust reduces the costs of productive economic exchange by lowering transaction costs, thus raising the cost of rent-seeking behavior. In addition, trust increases political accountability, discouraging politicians from creating regulatory rents. We therefore hypothesize that trust reduces the extent of business regulation while simultaneously facilitating market efficiency. To test that hypothesis, we construct an overall business regulation index measuring procedures, time, and cost along eight dimensions of doing business in a country. The empirical results reveal that trust negatively relates to business regulation but positively relates to market efficiency. Interaction and split-sample results further indicate that trust and business regulation are substitutes. Collectively, the findings reported herein suggest that business regulation itself is not the root cause of market inefficiency, but rather lack of trust is the dominant factor.
