Bridging the accountability and transparency gap in inter-municipal collaboration

Municipal governments are increasingly showing interest in inter-municipal cooperation. Often overlooked in the discussion of such collaborative relationships are concerns related to accountability and transparency. In this article, we introduce a framework to measure accountability and transparency in inter-local relationships and test it with a brief case study of inter-municipal cooperative agreements collected from the Greater Toronto Area. Overall, the agreements collected score very low on our accountability scale, mainly because of low levels of public access and poor internal accountability. We conclude the study by examining the challenges of having multiple lines of accountability in local service collaboration.     

Administering elections in a digital age: Online voting in Ontario municipalities

To date, online voting studies have focused on impacts on political behaviour and voting security. Analyses of impacts on administrators and electoral governance remain sparse internationally and are relegated to overviews in technical reports in Canada (Pammett and Goodman 2013; Goodman and Pyman 2016). Drawing on an original survey of local administrators in Ontario following the 2014 municipal elections, this article explores how online voting impacts election administration. Findings suggest strong satisfaction with online voting, citizen‐centered rationales for adoption, and key differences in challenges and cost based on municipal size. We conclude with implications for the local governance of elections as technology plays a greater role in voting processes.     

Cooperation,coordination and competition: Why do municipalities participate in economic development alliances?

Economic development is a policy area typically seen by municipalities as competitive in nature. Cooperation with neighbouring municipalities is rare, as the benefits are often selective. This paper examines the formation and governance of economic development alliances in Canada, specifically exploring the motivations of municipalities entering into these cooperative relationships. Four main factors influenced a municipality's decision to cooperate on economic development: reducing duplication, increasing international visibility, filling service gaps, and allowing for greater access to federal and provincial grants. Economic conditions dictated the course of partnership. Dividing mutual gains is the major challenge to overcome in order to keep economic development alliances together.     

Parties and Electoral Performance in the Market for Political Consultants

We investigate whether the hiring relationships of candidates and political consulting firms better resembles the predictions of the “adversarial” or “allied” models of consultant‐party interaction. We find that the highest‐quality consultants are not allocated to the most competitive races, consultant‐candidate relationships persist even as candidates' electoral prospects change, and firms who work for challengers face a higher risk of market exit than firms working for incumbents. The market focuses entirely on win‐loss records and ignores the information on consultant performance available in candidates' vote shares. These findings depict a market driven by individual candidate, rather than aggregate party, goals.     

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has waged a secessionist campaign in the Southern Philippines since 1978, when they broke away from the secular Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Their avowed goal is to establish an independent Islamic state. Though initially armed and supported by the Libyan and Malaysian governments, by the early 1990s, the MILF had lost much of its state support and forged a tentative relationship with Al Qaeda, receiving money through Saudi charities, as well as limited military training. In exchange, they had to give some assistance to groups, such as Al Qaeda's regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf group (ASG); ties that they continue to maintain. Thus the ongoing peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF have regional security operations.     

What a Difference a Grade Makes: Evidence from New York City's Restaurant Grading Policy

Can governments use grades to induce businesses to improve their compliance with regulations? Does public disclosure of compliance with food safety regulations matter for restaurants? Ultimately, this depends on whether grades matter for the bottom line. Based on 28 months of data on more than 15,000 restaurants in New York City, this article explores the impact of public restaurant grades on economic activity and public resources using rigorous panel data methods, including fixed‐effects models with controls for underlying food safety compliance. Results show that A grades reduce the probability of restaurant closure and increase revenues while increasing sales taxes remitted and decreasing fines relative to B grades. Conversely, C grades increase the probability of restaurant closure and decrease revenues while decreasing sales taxes remitted relative to B grades. These findings suggest that policy makers can incorporate public information into regulations to more strongly incentivize compliance.     

Why fight secession? Evidence of economic motivations from the American Civil War

Why fight secession? This paper is a case study on this question, asking why the North chose to fight the South in the American Civil War. It tests a theoretical prediction that economic motivations were important, using county-level presidential election data. If economic interests like manufacturing wished to keep the Union together, they should have generated votes to do so. That prediction is borne out by the data, and explanations other than Northern economic concerns about Southern secession appear unable to explain the results, suggesting that economic motivations were important to support for fighting the South.