Local government reform in South Africa: An analysis of financial management legislative compliance by municipalities

South African local government has undergone radical transformation. The reform process included a local government financial management best‐practice technical assistance programme (MFMTAP) targeting financial management and especially budget quality reform. Dollery and Graves (2009) earlier examined the efficacy of the South African National Treasury (NT's) municipal budget funding compliance technique for measuring adherence to the Municipal Finance Management Act's (MFMA) budget funding requirements using a single metropolitan municipality case study. This article further evaluates the robustness and validity of the funding compliance instrument as a reform performance measurement tool by comparing the results of four geographically and demographically different municipalities. Also introduced is a performance ‘trend’ instrument similar to a ‘Likert scale’ for comparing municipal performance. Optimal tax revenue theory is invoked to examine this key revenue variable for producing a compliant budget. The article finds the ‘budget funding’ reform component of the Best‐Practice Technical Assistance (BPTA) programme presently ineffective and unsustainable. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fit for the Job: Candidate Qualifications and Vote Choice in Low Information Elections

Cues and heuristics—like party, gender, and race/ethnicity—help voters choose among a set of candidates. We consider candidate professional experience—signaled through occupation—as a cue that voters can use to evaluate candidates’ functional competence for office. We outline and test one condition under which citizens are most likely to use such cues: when there is a clear connection between candidate qualifications and the particular elected office. We further argue that voters in these contexts are likely to make subtle distinctions between candidates, and to vote accordingly. We test our account in the context of local school board elections, and show—through both observational analyses of California election results and a conjoint experiment—that (1) voters favor candidates who work in education; (2) that voters discriminate even among candidates associated with education by only favoring those with strong ties to students; and (3) that the effects are not muted by partisanship. Voters appear to value functional competence for office in and of itself, and use cues in the form of candidate occupation to assess who is and who is not fit for the job.

     

Class War in the Voting Booth: Bias Against High-Income Congressional Candidates

Do Americans care how much money congressional candidates earn? We conducted three experiments to examine how candidates' incomes affect voters' perceptions of the candidates' traits and ultimately their vote intention. Subjects evaluated otherwise identical candidates with annual incomes randomly varying between $75,000, $3 million, and a candidate with no income information provided. Results from the three experiments are remarkably similar. Subjects viewed the $3 million earner as significantly more intelligent than the candidate with no income information provided, but this benefit of high income was overshadowed by significant biases against the $3 million candidate. Subjects consistently viewed the $3 million earner as less honest, less caring, and less representative of them than the other candidates. Ultimately, subjects were less likely to say they would vote for the $3 million candidate. These findings demonstrate that the campaign advantages that high-income candidates enjoy are somewhat offset by voters' initial bias against them.