KEEPING SODA IN SNAP: Understanding the Other Iron Triangle

Participants in SNAP have always been allowed to use their taxpayer-funded benefit to purchase Sugar Sweetened Beverages (SSBs). Despite an acute public health crisis surrounding the consumption of unhealthy products including SSBs, especially among the low-income citizens who also qualify for SNAP benefits, this policy has yet to be changed. Interviews with policy participants in Washington, D.C., reveal that change is being blocked by a culture of “personal responsibility” in America, plus three specific political forces: corporate lobbying primarily by the beverage and food retail industries; a desire by liberals to defend SNAP as income support for the poor even if nutrition outcomes are sub-optimal; and institutional inertia within the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural committees of Congress. In the 2018 farm bill debate, this “iron triangle” of bipartisan resistance to change was strong enough to block even a pilot study of SSB restrictions in SNAP.     

You're OK,I'm OK: The Self-Presentation of Affective Reactions to Deprivation

Two experiments compared public and private reports of affective reactions to deprivation. In Experiment 1, participants completed a questionnaire concerning their resentment about poor marks in a course; they had previously been led to believe that another participant was either angry or not angry about his/her marks. Participants' ratings of resentment were more affected by the other participant's alleged emotions in a public than in a private reporting condition. In Experiment 2, employed adults completed a questionnaire concerning their affective reactions to the lack of day care facilities available for working parents; they had previously been led to believe that the experimenter was either upset or not upset about the facilities. When respondents' answers were public, their ratings of resentment were affected by the experimenter's alleged emotions, whereas under conditions of private responding, there was no effect of the experimenter's alleged emotions. Taken together, these experiments provide initial evidence that self-presentation motives can influence reports of affective reactions to deprivation. In particular, our data show that self-presentation can induce a matching strategy whereby public expressions of resentment mirror the expressions of salient others. Two experiments compared public and private reports of affective reactions to deprivation. In Experiment 1, participants completed a questionnaire concerning their resentment about poor marks in a course; they had previously been led to believe that another participant was either angry or not angry about his/her marks. Participants' ratings of resentment were more affected by the other participant's alleged emotions in a public than in a private reporting condition. In Experiment 2, employed adults completed a questionnaire concerning their affective reactions to the lack of day care facilities available for working parents; they had previously been led to believe that the experimenter was either upset or not upset about the facilities. When respondents' answers were public, their ratings of resentment were affected by the experimenter's alleged emotions, whereas under conditions of private responding, there was no effect of the experimenter's alleged emotions. Taken together, these experiments provide initial evidence that self-presentation motives can influence reports of affective reactions to deprivation. In particular, our data show that self-presentation can induce a matching strategy whereby public expressions of resentment mirror the expressions of salient others.     

A Latent Factor Approach to Belief in a Just World and its Association with Well-Being

Social Justice Research - Drawing on justice motive theory (Lerner et al. in Berkowitz and Walster (eds) Advances in experimental social psychology. Academic Press, New York, 1976), in the present...     

Moderation and Competence: How a Party's Ideological Position Shapes Its Valence Reputation

We combine several strands of research from electoral behavior and party politics to suggest that ideological moderation will boost a party's perceived competence. Less radical parties are seen as readier to compromise, more realistic about what can be achieved, and less prone to simplistic solutions. The results of conjoint experiments with party profiles show that while an ideological leaning carries no cost, any appreciably left- or right-wing position eroded a party's perceived competence among a representative sample of around 2,000 British citizens. This effect holds when controlling for respondents’ ideological proximity to the party in question, and it looks to operate through all three of the proposed mechanisms suggested above—especially willingness to compromise. These findings have important implications both for party strategy and for voting research, highlighting a key channel through which ideological moderation yields electoral gains.     

New Institutionalism and Minority Protection in the National Legislatures of Finland and Denmark

The individual camps within the new institutionalist paradigm generally argue that every political actor operates within a specific framework of opportunities and that the physical environment in which bargaining takes place is very important to understanding political outcomes. This article uses three of the new institutionalisms to answer two important questions concerning minority‐protecting institutions in the national constitutions of Denmark (Article 42) and Finland (Section 66). First, why were such institutions developed? Second, why were these institutions ultimately removed in Finland, but not in Denmark? For both countries, it is argued in this article that historical and discursive institutionalism are useful for understanding why such protections were originally considered necessary by particular political groups in society: the rise of socialism during the late twentieth and early twenty‐first centuries compelled non‐reformist parties to push strongly for constitutional change that would legalize powerful procedural tools that could delay and potentially reverse policy decisions passed in parliament. However, the article invokes rational choice institutionalism to explain why the outcomes in terms of the use of such institutions differed over time in the two countries: differences concerning the scope and timing of the relevant procedures compelled opposition parties to utilize them differently. As a result, the legislative process was often stalemated in Finland (and the procedures were subsequently removed in 1992), while in Denmark, the procedures contributed to a parliamentary culture based on consensus and pre‐legislative bargaining and hence, still remain.     

Turning Up the Heat: Partisanship in Deliberative Innovation

Two forum types have featured prominently in deliberative practice: (1) forums involving partisans (such as key 'stakeholders') and (2) forums involving non-partisans (such as 'lay citizens'). Drawing on deliberative theory and cases from Germany, we explore the relative merits of these forum types in terms of deliberative capacity, legitimacy and political impact. The two types offer deliberative governance something different. Non-partisan forums such as citizens' juries or consensus conferences rate favorably in deliberative capacity, but can fall short when it comes to external legitimacy and policy impact. Contrary to expectations, partisan forums can also encounter substantial legitimation and impact problems. How can designed forums contribute to deliberative democratization, given that partisanship is an inevitable fact of politics? We offer some suggestions about how deliberative theory and practice might better accommodate the reality of partisanship, while securing benefits revealed in non-partisan forums.