International terrorism

In this article, it is argued that the U.S. ICBM force has no strategic value and should be dismantled. The article outlines a post‐cold war U.S. strategic nuclear force and proposes how this dyad force fits a strategy rather than offering a strategy to fit within the force. Deterrence theory anchors the analysis here. Second, this article asserts that U.S. security will be enhanced in the next century with Russian‐American cooperation on nuclear issues. Moving to a dyad now is step one in that direction, which in turn changes the perception of U.S. strategic weapons.

As weapons proliferate, deterrence against renegade nations and groups must become the cornerstone of U.S. doctrine. A dyad force and Russian‐American cooperation, both steps that restructure U.S. doctrine, will begin a process that deters these nations or groups.

This article depicts how each leg of the U.S. triad that remains following the START II treaty is a continuation of START I logic and planning. In other words, the article attempts to show how the rationale for a START II treaty force does not mirror a changed world. The purpose of this evidence is not to be dogmatic or critical but to strengthen the argument that U.S. nuclear strategy is still reflective of a bygone era.     

Identity,Ideology, and Malleability

Roel Meijer's edited volume fills massive gaps in the Western literature on Salafism, presenting a highly nuanced account of a diverse and internally divided religious identity movement while avoiding the opposing pitfalls of apologetics and polemics. Aside from the diversity of the movement, a key theme throughout the volume is the persistent malleability of Salafi ideology, which has major implications for states, social policy, and international security. The unavoidable conclusion seems to be that even “quietist” strands cannot be considered reliably quietist. Those who seek to better understand the tensions within Salafism, the relationship between this movement and states around the world, and how Salafism stands in relation to various forms of aggressive, violent contention would be well-advised to refer to this volume.     

Development as institutional change: The pitfalls of monocropping and the potentials of deliberation

Development theory has moved from a single-minded focus on capital accumulation toward a more complex understanding of the institutions that make development possible. Yet, instead of expanding the range of institutional strategies explored, the most prominent policy consequence of this “institutional turn” has been the rise of “institutional monocropping”: the imposition of blueprints based on idealized versions of Anglo-American institutions, the applicability of which is presumed to transcend national circumstances and cultures. The disappointing results of monocropping suggest taking the institutional turn in a direction that would increase, rather than diminish, local input and experimentation. The examples of Porto Alegre, Brazil, and Kerala, India, reinforce Amartya Sen’s idea that “public discussion and exchange” should be at the heart of any trajectory of institutional change, and flag potential gains from strategies of “deliberative development” which rely on popular deliberation to set goals and allocate collective goods. Peter Evans teaches in the Sociology Department at the University of California, Berkeley, where he holds the Marjorie Meyer Eliaser Chair of International Studies. He is currently exploring the role of labor as a transnational social movement. His earlier research has focused on the role of the state in industrial development, an interest reflected in his bookEmbedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton University Press 1995). He is also interested in urban environmental issues, as indicated by the recent edited volume,Livable Cities: Urban Struggles for Livelihood and Sustainability (University of California Press 2002). I would like to thank the editors, Atul Kohli, Dani Rodrik, and Anne Wetlerberg for their valuable comments and suggestions. Remaining analytical and empirical errors are, of course, my own. For an earlier effort (in Portugese) to make this argument, see Evans 2003.