Shifts of meaning within explanations of voting and party competition

Rational choice models are increasingly used in explanations of voting and elections. Their adoption is often urged, rather uncritically, on the grounds that they provide a unified and exact explanation across political science. Far from doing so, however, their definitions of ‘rationality’ may differ radically even within a limited area, such as party and voting behaviour. Shifts of meaning from one model to another may be obscured by mathematical formalism, which concentrates attention on the derivation of conclusions from basic assumptions, rather than on the practical relevance of their relationship to the assumptions behind other models. A mathematical formulation may not, however, be the most relevant for purposes of electoral explanation. Rigorous verbal formulations can represent electors' and politicians' decision procedures more realistically, while remaining generally accessible and supporting detailed inter-comparisons of their working assumptions. Through these, rational choice explanations can be brought closer together and decisions between them made with a clear knowledge of what is involved, thus providing a better basis for cumulative research. The process of theoretical evaluation and assimilation is illustrated here with two original theories of voting and party competition.     

Vicarious liability and criminal prosecutions for regulatory offences

The parameters of vicarious liability of corporations for the conduct of their employees, especially in the context of provisions that criminalise breaches of regulatory provisions, are complex. The decision of Bell J in ABC Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v Wallace [2006] VSC 171 raises starkly the potential unfairness of an approach which converts criminal liability of corporations too readily into absolute liability, irrespective of the absence of any form of proven culpability. The author queries whether fault should not be brought back in some form to constitute a determinant of criminal liability for corporations.     

THE ASSETS TEST: A CASE STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF EXPENDITURE CONTROL*

Abstract: The assets test episode provides a case study in the difficulties modern governments face when confronted by numerous and powerful interest groups. The assets test decision was made somewhat hastily and without extensive consultation, resulting in a major outcry from interest groups. The government reacted by setting in train a process of “consultation” and subsequently announced a series of concessions. Opposition continued and further modifications were made to the scheme, reducing considerably its impact and the proposed savings. Several lessons can be drawn. Governments must attempt to consult affected interests seriously in the process of formulating proposals and, if necessary, mobilise countervailing interests against a dominant coalition. Joint discussions can help to moderate sharp differences. The private, bureaucratic worlds of policy making, particularly in the budget cycle, must be opened up. Fundamental changes to the “culture” of policy making may be necessary, in particular greater efforts to encourage bipartisanship and to use Parliament constructively, if expenditure control and program reconstruction are to be achieved.     

Conceptualising and measuring ‘centrism’ correctly on the Left–Right scale (RILE) - without systematic bias. A general response by MARPOR

The purpose of this response is to point out that claims of undue centrism in the MARPOR data are directly contradicted by its use to correct centrism in other leading policy measures including expert surveys.     

Post‐Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away

This article analyses the critical yet elusive notions of state neutrality, secularism and religious coercion under the European Convention in light of the European Court of Human Rights recent decision in Lautsi v Italy. We contend that the real concern in the Italian crucifix case was not the infringement of the school pupils’ religious freedom nor the proselytising or coercive effect of the ‘passive’ religious symbols. Rather, opponents of the longstanding symbols were animated by desire for strict religious equality, a notion that is, correctly in our view, not guaranteed under the Convention. Lautsi has significantly cleared the conceptual undergrowth surrounding state neutrality and the varieties of secularism, reined in the elastic notion of religious coercion and eschewed attempts to squeeze the constitutional diversity of European religion‐state frameworks into a strict American‐style separationist mould. The Convention jurisprudence on freedom of religion has finally come of age.