Political pressure deflection

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.     

The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach

The riskiness of state employee pension plan portfolios varies across states. We investigate whether this variation is related to how public employees and taxpayers share actuarial surpluses of pension accounts. We focus on two determinants of a plan’s asset mix: the relative influence of public employees to taxpayers; and whether a surplus-sharing contract is specified. Our theoretical model demonstrates that the effect of public employee influence on the asset mix is ambiguous. Our empirical results corroborate this complex theoretical result. In our theoretical and empirical analyses, if a surplus sharing rule is specified, plans adopt a more aggressive investment allocation.     

Note on land reform in Bangladesh: The efficacy of ceilings

In this note, new data concerning the agrarian structure of Bangladesh are employed to test the efficacy of ceilings on the size of landholdings as a means of making land available to the landless and the near landless. The data confirm that the numbers of potential claimants for land far exceeds the potential supply, even if ceilings on holdings were lowered from 100 standard bighas (331/3 acres) to 25 standard bighas (81/3 acres).     

The Distinctive Significance of Systemic Risk

This paper suggests that “systemic risk” (e.g., of financial market collapse, or of ecological calamity) has a distinctive kind of moral significance. Two intuitive data points need to be explained. The first is that the systematic imposition of risk can be wrongful or unjust in and of itself, even if harm never ensues. The second is that, even so, there may be no one in particular to blame. We can explain both ideas in terms of what I call responsibilities of “Collective Due Care.” Collective Due Care arguably precludes purely aggregative cost‐benefit decision‐making and requires one kind of “precautionary” attitude in public choice.     

The intellectual legacy of J.E. Hodgetts

Abstract: J.E. (Ted) Hodgetts was influenced by both the political economy approach that he learned at the University of Toronto and by the comprehensive historical method developed by Leonard White, under whom he studied at Chicago. His first great project, Pioneer Public Service, convinced him that responsible government was impossible without responsible public administration. The authors examine how his response to management theories and practices evolved following his participation in the Glassco, Lambert and Gomery commissions. Hodgetts consistently refused the complete separation of politics and administration, and he promoted the use of management techniques to strengthen parliamentary supervision of the public service. The two key components of his legacy are thus a commitment to the democratic values of representative government and the comprehensive study of the internal dynamics of public administration in interaction with the relevant environmental factors.