2009年3月24—28日,马来西亚巫统(执政联盟"国阵"核心政党)举行最高理事会,选举新一届领导班子。马来西亚副总理达图·斯里·穆罕默德·纳吉布·宾·敦·哈吉·阿卜杜勒·拉扎克(Datuk Seri Mohd Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak)不战而胜当选巫统主席,并于4月3日宣誓就任马来西亚第六任总理。 相似文献
Utilizing national migration data regarding the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), this paper employs a difference-in-differences approach to empirically analyze the relationship between human mobility and the transmission of infectious diseases in China. We show that national human mobility restrictions ascribed to the first-level public health emergency response policy effectively reduce both intercity and intracity migration intensities, thus leading to a declining scale of human mobility, which improves the effectiveness in controlling the epidemic. Human mobility restrictions have greater influences on cities with better economic development, denser populations, or larger passenger volumes. Moreover, mobility restriction measures are found to be better implemented in regions with increased public awareness, or with provincial leaders who have healthcare crisis management experience, local administrative experience, or the opportunity to serve a consecutive term.
This paper provides empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in China in the twenty-first century. Employing the city-level turnover data of political leaders in China between 2000 and 2018 and utilizing the fixed effects ordered logit model, we find that the likelihood of promotion of local leaders rises with their economic performance. This relationship holds more firmly in the municipal party secretary. The probability is also found to decrease with the economic performance of their immediate predecessors and neighboring cities. This finding is robust to various robustness tests. We interpret the finding as evidence that the relative economic performance (peer effects) also contributes to the local political turnover, in particular within a province. Moreover, after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, a material change in the personnel arrangement within the party arises and this promotion mechanism shows a dynamic change. Our study sheds some light on the growing literature emphasizing the relationship between political turnover and economic performance.
