The Private Interests of Public Officials: Financial Regulation in the US Congress

Legislators' private financial holdings affect policy decisions. Due to financial self‐interest, we theorize that legislators whose personal investment portfolios include equities from firms affected by proposed policies vote for legislation that benefits those firms. We also theorize that legislators with greater personal exposure to equity investments support policies that benefit equities markets generally. We create a novel data set of legislators' personal stock investments and examine major congressional actions since the 1990s on financial deregulation and market intervention. US House members who own stocks in firms who benefit from financial deregulation vote for deregulation. House members with greater exposure to financial and automotive stocks support the financial and auto bailouts, respectively. General exposure to equities markets is also associated with support for key legislation boosting markets. The normative implications are significant, as legislators' private interests influence decisions in the public sphere.     

The Demand for Protectionism: Democracy,Import Elasticity,and Trade Barriers

Numerous studies suggest that democracies employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. In this article, we examine the conditioning role that the elasticity of import demand at the commodity level plays on the relationship between democracy and import barriers. Beginning with the assumption that democracies are more responsive than nondemocracies to the preferences of mass publics, we demonstrate that the value of free trade as a public good depends on the elasticity of import demand. When import demand for a given commodity is inelastic, trade barriers are more harmful to consumers; as such, democracies will employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. However, as import demand becomes more elastic, publics find it easier to adjust to higher prices; as a result, the difference in imposed trade barriers by regime type decreases. We find support for this argument in statistical analyses of crosssectional data covering 4,656 commodities imported by 73 countries Furthermore, we find that democracies raise higher trade barriers than nondemocracies on commodities for which import demand is very elastic.     

For Better or Worse? Gender and Perceptions of Formal and Informal Justice Systems in Afghanistan

We draw on survey data from a national probability sample of 6,406 Afghan adults (aged 18 years and older) to explore gender differences in the perceptions of formal and informal justice systems. The study utilizes binary logistic regression to probe whether men and women differ in their attitudes and the extent to which other factors may mediate both within– and across–ethnic group differences. We find that women have more confidence in the formal system than their male counterparts, whereas the opposite is true for the informal system. The scholarly and policy implications of these results are discussed.     

Does the death penalty save lives?

Research Summary Economists have recently reexamined the “capital punishment deters homicide” thesis using modern econometric methods, with most studies reporting robust deterrent effects. The current study revisits this controversial question using annual state panel data from 1977 to 2006. Employing well‐known econometric procedures for panel data analysis, our results provide no empirical support for the argument that the existence or application of the death penalty deters prospective offenders from committing homicide. Policy Implications Although policymakers and the public can continue to base support for use of the death penalty on retribution, religion, or other justifications, defending its use based solely on its deterrent effect is contrary to the evidence presented here. At a minimum, policymakers should refrain from justifying its use by claiming that it is a deterrent to homicide and should consider less costly, more effective ways of addressing crime.     

The Mask of Neutrality: Judicial Partisan Calculation and Legislative Redistricting

Do judges ruling on redistricting litigation increase electoral competition in congressional races while simultaneously drawing districts favoring their party's congressional candidates? I offer a novel theory of judicial partisan calculation, arguing that judges draw more competitive districts than legislatures or commissions, but that judge‐drawn districts favor the electoral interests of their copartisans. These claims are reconcilable because judges target districts held by contrapartisan legislators to maximize their copartisans’ fortunes. I find that Democratic judges draw competitive districts by adding Democratic voters to Republican‐held House constituencies. Court‐administered redistricting increases competitiveness, ostensibly due to judicial neutrality. This mask of neutrality, however, conceals sophisticated partisan calculation.     

A Perspective on Errors,Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences and Direction for Continuing Advancement*

Abstract: The forensic sciences are under review more so than ever before. Such review is necessary and healthy and should be a continuous process. It identifies areas for improvement in quality practices and services. The issues surrounding error, i.e., measurement error, human error, contextual bias, and confirmatory bias, and interpretation are discussed. Infrastructure is already in place to support reliability. However, more definition and clarity of terms and interpretation would facilitate communication and understanding. Material improvement across the disciplines should be sought through national programs in education and training, focused on science, the scientific method, statistics, and ethics. To provide direction for advancing the forensic sciences a list of recommendations ranging from further documentation to new research and validation to education and to accreditation is provided for consideration. The list is a starting point for discussion that could foster further thought and input in developing an overarching strategic plan for enhancing the forensic sciences.     

Physically violent husbands of the 1890s and their resources

This article applies Goode's Resource Theory of wife beating to Lane County, Oregon from 1891 to 1900. The sample population consists of 56 women who appeared in divorce suits and claimed that their husbands had physically abused them. The study's findings largely support Resource Theory, although biases in the sample population make it more suggestive than conclusive. Wife beaters of the 1890s tended to be relatively low in economic and social resources, particularly when compared to their wives. The violent husbands' resources appear particularly slight when their psychological resources are considered. The article closes by suggesting that Resource Theory is not necessarily at odds with feminist interpretations of wife battering. Social scientists who assert that husbands' physical violence is more likely when their dominance is pronounced rather than fragile need to define more carefully and detect the actual level of power and resources that particular husbands enjoy.