Federal‐provincial overlap and civil servants: The case of occupational training in Quebec and Ontario

Abstract: Over the years, many analysts concerned with how federations work have presented the reduction of federal‐provincial overlap and duplication as a way of decreasing intergovernmental tensions. While some have presented such overlap and duplication as inevitable or even beneficial, few have tried to establish how overlap really works and whether it is a real problem or one created mostly by the provincial governments who wish to take issue with problems of federal funding, joint management and accountability. Despite the fact that, ultimately, public officials are in the best position to determine whether federal‐provincial overlap is causing inefficiencies, even fewer studies have focused on how they manage their relationship in areas where two orders of government are involved. Thus, the best possible source of information on how overlapping sectors are managed has been left out. This article examines how federal and provincial officials in Quebec and Ontario have managed their relationships in a particularly contentious sector: occupational training. Sommaire: Plusieurs auteurs intéressés au fonctionnement des fédérations ont, au fil des années, eu tendance à présenter la réduction des empiètements et recoupements fédéraux‐provinciaux comme une façon de décroître les tensions intergouvememen‐tales. Certains auteurs ont présenté de tels chevauchements et dédoublements comme inévitables, voire bénéfiques, mais peu d'entre eux se sont penchés sur le véritable fonctionnement de ces empiètements et s'ils sont un problème réel ou principalement créé par les gouvernements provinciaux désireux d'engager une contro‐verse sur des questions de financement, de gestion commune et d'imputabilité. Bien que les fonctionnaires soient, ultimement, les mieux placés pour évaluer si les recoupements fédéraux‐provinciaux constituent des sources d'inéfficience, peu d'écrits font état de la façon dont les fonctionnaires gèrent leurs relations lorsque les deux ordres de gouvernement sont impliqués. Ainsi, la meilleure source d'information sur la gestion de ce type de recoupements nous manque. Dans cet article, nous examinons comment des fonctionnaires fédéraux et provinciaux au Québec et c'n Ontario ont géré leurs relations dans un domaine particulièrement conflictuel: la formation de la main‐d'æeuvre.     

A minimax procedure for electing committees

A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance to voters’ ballots, where these ballots are weighted by their proximity to other voters’ ballots. This minimax outcome may be diametrically opposed to the outcome obtained by aggregating approval votes in the usual manner, which minimizes the sum of the Hamming distances and is called the minisum outcome. The manipulability of these procedures, and their applicability when election outcomes are restricted in various ways, are also investigated. The minimax procedure is applied to the 2003 Game Theory Society election of a council of 12 new members from a list of 24 candidates. By rendering outlying voters less influential and not antagonizing any voters too much, it arguably would have produced a committee more representative of the interests of all voters than the minisum committee that was elected.     

Making economic adjustment work: The politics of policy implementation

This article identifies tentative lessons about successful political management of stabilization and structural adjustment policies in developing countries. It addresses three basic questions: 1) What is the purpose of stabilization and structural adjustment policies and what specific measures are usually undertaken? 2) Who, in theory, is supposed to benefit or lose from such policies and who, in actual practice, supports or opposes them? 3) How have governments in developing countries successfully managed the supporters and opponents of adjustment policies? The article concentrates in detail on how the governments of Panama, Costa Rica and Guatemala managed the actual supporters and opponents of these policies between 1982 and 1987, based on interviews with policy makers, official documents and content analysis of media sources, with the aim of determining what measures were implemented, who protested or supported them, and what the government did to build support or minimize opposition. The lessons from these three experiences are tied to the more general literature on successful political management of stabilization and structural adjustment.     

Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards

An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the Public Choice Society Meeting, Tucson AZ, 27–29 March 1987. Our thanks to Laura Langbein, Steve Maser, Eugenia Froedge-Toma, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments. Special thanks to George Racette.     

Budget Control in Virginia Public School Districts

This article examines the selection and use of a budget approval technique. Specifically, two research questions are addressed: (1) Does the use of a particular budget approval method by a governmental body impact the execution of the budget? (2) What characteristics of a local government are associated with its decision to use a particular budget approval method? Both research questions are addressed by analyzing data from public school systems in the Commonwealth of Virginia, specifically, whether using categorical budget approval differs in the accuracy of budgeting versus using a lump-sum approval method. Characteristics of Virginia school districts are also analyzed according to whether any of them are likely to be associated with school districts using a particular approval method. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the next section describes the role of budgeting control in schools; subsequent sections review Virginia school district budgeting practices, develop the empirical model used to test the hypotheses, describe the sample, analyze the results of empirical tests and discuss implications of the findings.     

Does European Community Regional Policy Empower the Regions?

A central goal of the 1980s reforms of the European Community's regional development policy was to contribute to an increase in the discretionary authority of sub–national decision–makers in the Community's member states. This article assesses the degree to which this goal was attained through comparative studies of selected French and Italian regions. It concludes that only in those regions in which timely policy entrepreneurship on the part of regional–level elected leaders coincided with the pre–existence of a territorial policy Community for economic development did the transfer of resources from the Community contribute to regional empowerment.