Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital: capping medical practice reform in Illinois

On February 4, 2010 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down Illinois' medical practice reform bill, P.A. 94-677, when it decided Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital. Although the court only considered the unconstitutionality of the cap on non-economic damages contained in that bill, an inseverability provision resulted in the invalidation of all of its provisions. The end result of the Lebron decision extends much further than the striking of the cap on non-economic damages. It affects such areas as medical liability insurance law, physician discipline, public disclosure of information, the admissibility of physician statements into evidence, and expert witness standards. The Lebron holding has raised a significant obstacle to the implementation of a wide range of legislative measures intended to improve both the delivery and quality of healthcare services in Illinois. This article explains the impact of Lebron in these collateral, but important, areas of the law.     

Change blindness can cause mistaken eyewitness identification

The current study investigated the effects of change blindness and crime severity on eyewitness identification accuracy. This research, involving 717 subjects, examined change blindness during a simulated criminal act and its effects on subjects' accuracy for identifying the perpetrator in a photospread. Subjects who viewed videos designed to induce change blindness were more likely to falsely identify the innocent actor relative to those who viewed control videos. Crime severity did not influence detection of change; however, it did have an effect on eyewitness accuracy. Subjects who viewed a more severe crime ($500 theft) made fewer errors in perpetrator identification than those who viewed a less severe crime ($5 theft). This research has theoretical implications for our understanding of change blindness and practical implications for the real‐world problem of faulty eyewitness testimony.     

Protecting the Common Good: Technology, Objectivity, and Privacy

The rhetoric of public policy after September 11 encourages us to believe that the preservation of freedom and the safety of the common good requires our universal acquiescence to technological invasions of privacy. The purpose of this article is simply to warn that the rhetoric of public policy solutions post–September 11 may be inconsistent with the philosophical and legal framework of American democracy. While serving as a solution today, this rhetoric may pose a devastating blow to the balance of individual privacy and common good that is essential to the preservation of freedom.