Interest group demand for taxation

Researchers have typically ignored the determinants of the tax structure of the public sector. Political scientists have concentrated their analyses on the expenditure side of the public ledgers while economists have avoided the issue by assuming that taxes are exogenously determined. In this paper we have shown that a behavioral model of political interest groups can be employed to gain insights into the political selection of taxes. The theory provides a general complement to the well-documented analysis of special interest demand for public expenditures.Our analysis raises several important policy questions. First, is the influence of interest groups on the determination of tax systems desirable from a public policy perspective? For example, special interest groups dominated by high and middle income individuals may prefer regressive tax systems which reduce their own tax burden. Certainly the impact of interest groups on the well-known regressivity of state and local tax systems is an area worthy of additional investigation.     

Law’s (Masculine) Violence: Reshaping Jurisprudence

This article critiques and expands upon the jurisprudence of law’s violence from feminist and lesbian/gay/queer perspectives. The incorporation of gender and sexuality into the jurisprudence of law’s violence, via the social experiences of women and gay men, highlights the masculine and heteronormative character of law’s violence, while bringing into view particular forms of law’s violence, and forms of extra-legal but thoroughly legitimate heterosexual male violence, that have remained invisible in previous accounts. A feminist analysis of violence also suggests that law’s regime of violence is neither totalising nor inevitable, and that possibilities for resistance, if not avoidance, do exist.     

Myanmar's Electoral System: Reviewing the 2010 and 2012 Elections and Looking Ahead to the 2015 General Elections

Myanmar's 2010 multi-party election was the nation's first in two decades, signaling a manufactured transition from nearly half a century of military dictatorship toward parliamentary democracy. The current single-member district, plurality voting electoral system limits the parliamentary representation of smaller, ethnic political parties, and inflates the influence of larger, enfranchised parties, jeopardizing peaceful national reconciliation between various factions and the country's inchoate democratic institutions. Myanmar's Union Electoral Commission should consider electoral reforms that: (a) maximize proportional representation; (b) guarantee peace and political stability; and (c) guarantee a sufficient parliamentary majority that can govern the nascent democracy. The ideal system for the upcoming 2015 general elections is a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) one, with one parliamentary house electing ministers by plurality in regional districts and the other with proportional representation by party list. This paper considers alternative electoral systems in light of the status quo and argues that MMP would produce the most stable and representative results for all parties concerned.