How malleable are political‐economic institutions? The case of labour‐market decision‐making in British Columbia

Abstract: This article reviews two efforts to reform labour‐market decision‐making in British Columbia during the 1990s that were designed to increase the private sector's role in developing and administering education and training programs. The first effort was the British Columbia Labour Force Development Board, created in 1994 and closed in 1996; the second was the Industry Training and Apprenticeship Commission, launched in 1997 and still in operation at the time of writing. Each reform sought to foster cooperation among public‐ and private‐sector actors in the labour‐market field in “associational” arrangements. In so doing, the reforms ran counter to institutionally entrenched patterns of behaviour in B.C.‘s political economy, which favour conflict between business and labour and limited involvement of private‐sector actors in public‐sector labour‐market institutions. This article assesses the extent to which these institutional constraints precluded the success of these reforms. The evidence suggests that they did, and that political‐economic institutions are therefore a powerful and relatively rigid constraint on innovations of the associational type. Nevertheless, the article concludes that such reforms are more likely to succeed at the sectoral or local level, where these constraints are less compelling and where the forces that encourage associational reforms are particulary strong. Sommaire: Cet article passé en revue deux efforts de réforme de la prise de décisions concemant le marché du travail en Colombie‐Britannique au cours des années 1990 et qui visaient à augmenter le rôle du secteur privé dans I'elaboration et l'administra‐tion des programmes d'enseignement et de formation. Le premier de ces efforts fut le Conseil de développement de la main‐doeuvre de la Colombie‐Britannique, créé en 1994 et aboli en 1996; le deuxième fut la Commission d'apprentissage et de formation industriels, mise sur pied en 1997 et existant toujours à l'heure actuelles. Chacune de ces réformes visait à favoriser la collaboration entre les intervenants publics et privés du marché du travail, au moyen d'arrangements « associatifs «. Ce faisant, les réformes allaient à l'encontre des comportements institutionnellement ancrés dans I'économie politique de la C‐B., qui favorisent le conflit entre le patronat et les syndicates ainsi qu'une participation limitée des intervenants du secteur privé dans les institutions du marché du travail du secteur public. Cet article évaluée à quel point ces contraintes institutionnelles ont ernpiêché la réussite de ces réformes. Il semblerait effectivement qu'elles I'ont empêkhé. Les institutions politico‐économiques représen‐tent donc une contrainte rigide et puissante pour les innovations de type associatif. Néanmoins, on conclut que de telles réformes ont de meilleures chances de succé‐formes ont de meilleures chances de succès au niveau sedoriel ou local, où ces contraintes sont moindres et où les forces qui encouragent les réformes associatives sont particulièrement fortes.     

Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States

The inclusion of racial/ethnic minorities is often considered an important factor leading to a relatively limited American welfare system. However, given the federal nature of welfare eligibility rules and the states' role in determining benefit levels, few studies explicitly link questions of inclusion and benefit levels when explaining the evolution of American welfare policy. This study examines the relationship between inclusion and benefit levels by analyzing state policies related to the welfare reforms of 1996 which allowed states to decide if recent immigrants would be included in welfare benefits, and subsequently the extent to which this decision affected overall benefit levels offered by states under TANF. The results suggest that states' decisions regarding inclusion subsequently affect benefit levels, with the direction of these relationships most closely reflecting the erosion model's prediction of broader eligibility associated with lower benefit levels.     

Insurance Market for Global Warming Heats Up: Old Products and New Policies Respond to Climate Change Risks

Climate change, characterized by higher surface and water temperatures, will likely lead to more frequent and severe storms, floods, rising sea levels, wildfires, and loss of a variety of species. The monetary loss attributable to these events could be enormous, resulting in a variety of first-party insurance claims and third-party lawsuits. The availability of insurance coverage to pay these claims will depend on the nature of weather-related losses and the particular policies in force. Insurers have also begun to develop products that pay to rebuild to “greener” standards after fortuitous losses, encourage lower carbon emissions, and provide incentives for the implementation of sustainable business and personal practices.     

Community organization and gang policy response

Analysis of agency response networks in 21 urban areas reveals that the adoption of policy responses is significantly related to social network location. In the 1988 National Youth Gang Intervention and Suppression Program survey, agency representatives were asked to list agencies with which regular contact was maintained in the process of dealing with the youth gang problem. Policy response is measured by the adoption of four policy responses: (1) making staff training available, (2) having a policy for dealing with youth gang problems, (3) having a policy in writing, and (4) attempting to influence legislation on the youth gang problem. Rasch modeling supports the scalability of the four items. The STRUCTURE program is used to identify elements of network structure within each community-specifically cliques and equivalence structures. A generalized linear model analysis of variance of the policy response scale reveals that structural equivalence and clique membership account for 54% of the variation in policy response. An examination of clique means indicates that network structure may retard as well as enhance policy response adaptations. In policy terms, this finding suggests that network structure should be mobilized by those who wish to develop a unified, national-level response to youth gang problems at the local level.     

Water transfers,irrigation districts,and the compensation problem

Despite statutory reforms and potentially large economic gains from water trades, water markets have been slow to develop throughout the West. This article examines an institutional impediment that has not received adequate attention: How can irrigation districts structure water trades to benefit their customers? It shows how this question can be satisfactorily answered by organizing a proposed water trade like a friendly corporate tender offer. While seemingly a radical procedure, the method conforms with a simple economic interpretation of statute and case law that (1) describes the trustee relationship between irrigation district boards and their customers and (2) defines the equitable and beneficial interest of landowners in the district's water supply.