Social and economic impact of the commercialization of the Argus II artificial retina in the United States

Each year, the United States invests about $45 billion in research conducted by federal researchers within federal laboratories. These efforts generate extensive social benefits when results are transferred to the private sector. It is important that we effectively quantify the economic and societal impact of federal technology transfer activities to inform taxpayers and policymakers about the value of public investments in this form of research. The Argus II device, an artificial retina commercialized in the United States by Second Sight in 2013, provides a rich example of how private sector innovation can be enhanced by research collaborations with federal labs and academia. Over the 25-year journey from idea to product, Second Sight carried out research and development collaborations with six Department of Energy national laboratories and seven universities. The case of Argus II also offers valuable insight into (1) how private industry, academia, and government can work together to bring socially beneficial innovations to fruition and (2) the tradeoffs inherent in these public–private collaborations. In this paper, we use a Markov model to estimate the realized and potential future social benefits associated with Argus II. We provide an interactive tool that can be used to replicate our findings and modify assumptions using updated patient information as it becomes available. We also provide insight into the aspects of federal involvement surrounding the development of Argus II that contributed to its successful commercialization and discuss other spillover benefits from these public–private collaborations.     

Criminalization and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction

Convicted offenders face a host of so-called “collateral” consequences: formal measures such as legal restrictions on voting, employment, housing, or public assistance, as well as informal consequences such as stigma, family tensions, and financial insecurity. These consequences extend well beyond an offender’s criminal sentence itself and are frequently more burdensome than the sentence. This essay considers two respects in which collateral consequences may be relevant to the question of what the state should, or may, criminalize. First, they may be relevant according to specific accounts of criminalization, including plausible versions of the harm principle and legal moralism. Second, they may be relevant to the legitimacy of state criminalization more generally. Thus for legal theorists concerned with the issue of legitimate criminalization, normative questions raised by collateral consequences are of central importance.     

Do School Report Cards Produce Accountability Through the Ballot Box?

Public education has been transformed by the widespread adoption of accountability systems that involve the dissemination of school district performance information. Using data from Ohio, we examine if elections serve as one channel through which these accountability systems might lead to improvements in educational quality. We find little evidence that poor performance on widely disseminated state and federal indicators has an impact on school board turnover, the vote share of sitting school board members, or superintendent tenure, suggesting that the dissemination of district performance information puts little (if any) electoral pressure on elected officials to improve student achievement.     

Bridging the accountability and transparency gap in inter-municipal collaboration

Municipal governments are increasingly showing interest in inter-municipal cooperation. Often overlooked in the discussion of such collaborative relationships are concerns related to accountability and transparency. In this article, we introduce a framework to measure accountability and transparency in inter-local relationships and test it with a brief case study of inter-municipal cooperative agreements collected from the Greater Toronto Area. Overall, the agreements collected score very low on our accountability scale, mainly because of low levels of public access and poor internal accountability. We conclude the study by examining the challenges of having multiple lines of accountability in local service collaboration.     

Administering elections in a digital age: Online voting in Ontario municipalities

To date, online voting studies have focused on impacts on political behaviour and voting security. Analyses of impacts on administrators and electoral governance remain sparse internationally and are relegated to overviews in technical reports in Canada (Pammett and Goodman 2013; Goodman and Pyman 2016). Drawing on an original survey of local administrators in Ontario following the 2014 municipal elections, this article explores how online voting impacts election administration. Findings suggest strong satisfaction with online voting, citizen‐centered rationales for adoption, and key differences in challenges and cost based on municipal size. We conclude with implications for the local governance of elections as technology plays a greater role in voting processes.     

Cooperation,coordination and competition: Why do municipalities participate in economic development alliances?

Economic development is a policy area typically seen by municipalities as competitive in nature. Cooperation with neighbouring municipalities is rare, as the benefits are often selective. This paper examines the formation and governance of economic development alliances in Canada, specifically exploring the motivations of municipalities entering into these cooperative relationships. Four main factors influenced a municipality's decision to cooperate on economic development: reducing duplication, increasing international visibility, filling service gaps, and allowing for greater access to federal and provincial grants. Economic conditions dictated the course of partnership. Dividing mutual gains is the major challenge to overcome in order to keep economic development alliances together.     

Parties and Electoral Performance in the Market for Political Consultants

We investigate whether the hiring relationships of candidates and political consulting firms better resembles the predictions of the “adversarial” or “allied” models of consultant‐party interaction. We find that the highest‐quality consultants are not allocated to the most competitive races, consultant‐candidate relationships persist even as candidates' electoral prospects change, and firms who work for challengers face a higher risk of market exit than firms working for incumbents. The market focuses entirely on win‐loss records and ignores the information on consultant performance available in candidates' vote shares. These findings depict a market driven by individual candidate, rather than aggregate party, goals.