Explaining (and re-explaining) political change in the Middle East during the Arab Spring: trajectories of democratization and of authoritarianism in the Maghreb

After the 2011 Arab Spring, a pressing concern is to understand why some authoritarian regimes remain in power while others fall when confronted with similar difficulties. Earlier representations of the success of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa generated common misperceptions concerning politically effective behaviour in the region. These views, shared by local autocrats and international actors alike, led them to propose ad hoc policy reorientations in response to a contagion of popular uprisings. In their turn, these policy responses directly contributed to the failure of authoritarianism and the production of democratic revolutions in several countries of the region. Such revolutionary options, although structured by the (lack of) opportunities for contestation present in each polity, are not predicable events as they depend on elite mis-assessments of the situation to be effective (as in Tunisia, Libya). Reciprocally, when reform pathways are made available by authoritarian regimes, contestation can be channelled into non-revolutionary political action (as in Morocco, Algeria).     

What future for Kirkuk? Evidence from a deliberative intervention

The “youth bulge” in developing countries means that we need to pay close attention to how young people want to be governed. That need is particularly great in developing countries that are also deeply divided. But in divided societies, conventional opinion polls often do not suffice, yielding shallow opinions hostage to elite machinations and mutual mistrust. To shed light on what young people would want if they had a chance to learn and deliberate about the issues, we follow a survey with an intensive deliberative field experiment in one such society – Kirkuk. Contrary to widespread concerns about the predominance of ethnic interests, young educated Kirkukis support the view that different ethnic groups should have an equal say. There is also broad support for an institutional arrangement – Kirkuk’s becoming an autonomous region – that may provide space for instituting “equal say”. And deliberating with balanced information broadens support for that arrangement.     

北极地区安全维度变化与北极地区议题安全化

从狭义的国际政治(国家间政治)演进到广义的国际政治(全球政治),始于冷战后期,而全球政治成为国际政治的主流则是在冷战结束之后。全球政治时代的来临,使得安全维度发生了根本性变化。从纵向维度看,安全关注层次从国家向上扩展到国际体系和次国际体系、向下扩展到次国家和个体,由此导致安全指涉对象和安全化行为体不仅包括国家行为体,而且包括各种非国家行为体;从横向维度看,全球政治时代的安全关注已超越传统的政治和军事议题领域,拓宽到环境、经济和社会诸议题领域。北极地区的安全层次和安全领域变化就是在这样的背景下出现的。随着全球政治时代的来临,北极地区议题的安全化也日益引人关注。作为近北极国家,中国兼具安全指涉对象和安全化行为体的双重身份,在北极地区议题的安全化过程中,既要关注自身国家安全利益,也要关注超越国家安全利益的人类安全利益。     

Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent

Many studies have found that political discontent and populist voting are positively related. Yet, an important shortcoming of these studies is that they interpret the correlation between these two phenomena as evidence that existing feelings of political discontent contribute to the support for populist parties. We argue that there is also a causal effect in the opposite direction: Populist parties fuel political discontent by exposing their supporters to a populist message in which they criticize the elite. Our study links individual level data on political discontent of voters to the populist message of the party they intend to vote for, employing various operationalizations of populism. Based on a 6-wave panel study from the Netherlands (2008–2013), we conclude that political discontent is both cause and consequence of the rise of populist parties. Our findings imply that the effect of political discontent on populist voting has been overestimated in many previous studies.     

Modernisation and government socialisation: Considering explanations for gender differences in cohort trends in British voting behaviour

The lack of an overall gender gap in British voting behaviour hides considerable gender gaps within birth cohorts. This is not due to a gradual realignment of the gender gap related to modernisation, but instead to a gendered process of government socialisation. Men are especially supportive of the party that was in power during their formative years, particularly if it was in power for a sustained period of time. This is not consistently the case for women, and this gender difference produces political generations not only characterised by higher support for the party in power during their youth but also by gender gaps in voting behaviour.     

Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state power

This paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt).     

Researching counterterrorism: a personal perspective from a former undercover police officer

Written by an academic and former undercover police officer, this article consists of an initial response to Basia Spalek and Mary O’Rawe’s article “Researching Counter-terrorism: A Critical Perspective from the Field in Light of Allegations and Findings of Covert Activities by Undercover Police Officers”. It acknowledges the importance of concerns raised by Spalek and O’Rawe in regard to undercover policing and seeks to identify areas for constructive debate both in the immediate future and in the long term. Mike German’s book Thinking Like a Terrorist is referenced to illustrate a potential model of best practice when police officers are tasked to infiltrate groups or cells carrying out acts of terrorism and political violence. Likewise, Rachel Monaghan’s article “Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights” is referenced to suggest that German’s model might apply in respect of acts of terrorism and political violence committed in support of animal rights no less than when committed in support of far right politics. German’s book also serves to illustrate an argument that prior employment as an undercover police officer might not necessarily undermine trust in that officer's subsequent work of a different nature. Crucial here, is the author’s claim that his subsequent police partnership work with Muslim groups in London was based on reciprocal trust and did not employ deception, axiomatic to undercover policing, in any respect. Although the author is presently restricted by ongoing investigations and legal proceedings, the article outlines a basis on which he might contribute his experience of undercover policing to future discussions.     

In the Aftermath of Critique We Are Not in Epistemic Free Fall: Human Rights,the Subaltern Subject,and Non-liberal Search for Freedom and Happiness

The article challenges the claim that human rights, which have constituted one of the central tools by which to establish the truth claims of modernity, can produce freedom and meaningful happiness through the acquisition of more rights and more equality. Third World, postcolonial and feminist legal scholars have challenged the accuracy of this claim, amongst others. The critiques expose the discursive operations of human rights as a governance project primarily concerned with ordering the lives of non-European peoples, rather than a liberating force; and that the pre-given rational subject of human rights is contingent and one of the prime effects of power. I examine the problems with the liberal humanism of human rights by examining not only how it is linked to a specific understanding of the `good life’, freedom and happiness, but also how it closes off other emancipatory possibilities. The acquisition of human rights as objects that an individual has by virtue of being human, represent the terminal limits of human rights, rather than the moment when the human subject becomes empowered and liberated. I draw on queer affect theory to make a critique of happiness, to which I argue human rights are linked, and how the failed or unhappy subaltern subject exposes its normative composition. I discuss the resulting depth of the despair produced from the realisation that this political project cannot realise its promise of freedom and meaningful happiness, compelling a `turn away’ from human rights as an emancipatory project and a `turn towards’ other non-liberal philosophical traditions, in the search for alternative understandings of and space for freedom and happiness. I explore these possibilities specifically within the philosophical tradition of non-dualism (Advaita).     

Understanding UKIP: Identity,Social Change and the Left Behind

In this article we explore the structural shifts which help explain the emergence of UKIP as a major radical‐right political force in Britain. There are two distinct, but related, aspects to this story. The first is the changes to Britain's economic and social structure that have pushed to the margins a class of voters who we describe as the ‘left behind’: older, working‐class, white voters with few educational qualifications. The second is long‐term generational changes in the values that guide British society and shape the outlook of voters. These value shifts have also left older white working‐class voters behind, as a worldview which was once seen as mainstream has become regarded as parochial and intolerant by the younger, university‐educated, more socially liberal elites who define the political consensus of twenty‐first‐century Britain. We then move to consider the political changes that have further marginalised these voters, as first Labour and then the Conservatives focused their energies on recruiting and retaining support from middle‐class, moderate swing voters. Finally, we show how UKIP has developed into an effective electoral machine which looks to win and retain the loyalties of these voters. Finally, we discuss the longer‐term implications of the radical‐right revolt, which has the potential to change the nature of party competition in Britain in the 2015 election and beyond.