Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies

While military and civilian dictators tend to rule through fear, absolute monarchies do not depend exclusively on it and can also derive legitimacy from the historical, cultural and religious roles they play. That opportunity provides absolute monarchs with an option (constitutional monarchy) that is unavailable to other types of dictators. On the one hand, the institutional flexibility of that option might facilitate negotiations between an absolute monarch and the regime’s elites. On the other hand, it might complicate power-sharing, as the monarch may fail to commit to the principle of non-interference, while the regime’s elites may attempt to disempower the monarch. By formalizing a power-sharing game between a monarch and the regime’s elites, this paper argues that the threat of civil disobedience contributes to the resolution of commitment problems and also explains the reasons some constitutional monarchs hold and on occasion exercise substantive political powers despite the fact that their ability to survive presumably depends on their commitment to non-interference.

     

The political geography of electoral autocracies: The influence of party strongholds on political beliefs in Africa

In electoral autocracies, why do some citizens view the state as autocratic, while others see it as democratic and legitimate? Traditionally, indicators such as income and education have been the most important factors to explaining how different types of citizens understand politics. This article argues that in electoral autocracies, we must also take into account the role of political geography. In these types of regimes, opposition parties are often one of the only actors that provide information about the authoritarian nature the government, but their message tends to get quarantined within their strongholds. I argue that regardless of income, education, ethnicity, access to government spending, or even partisanship, citizens living in opposition strongholds should be far more likely to view the state as autocratic and illegitimate than citizens living in ruling party strongholds. I find evidence for this theory using Afrobarometer survey data paired with constituency-level electoral returns from five electoral autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa.     

劳资关系法律规范的历史演变与改革论争——历史与理论的宏观分析

2010年突发的一系列劳动争议事件诘问着“中国模式”。从法律层面来看，中国法制体系对劳动者的保护尚存在严重不足。文章从历史与理论的宏观视角，对发达国家劳资关系法律规范的历史演变及最新的改革论争做一阐释，并在此基础上，探寻中国劳资关系法律规范的应有之路，以期为中国的劳资关系调整抛砖引玉。     

The Intergenerational Effects of Political Influence: Evidence from China

This paper considers the effects of fathers’ political influence on their offspring’s labour market outcomes in China. Political influence refers to the ability to convert political power into economic benefits. This study identifies the dissolution of political influence by exploiting an age-based mandatory retirement rule in urban China. It exploits the variation of political influence in three dimensions: bureaucrat status, retirement status, and offspring gender. A difference-in-differences approach shows that the retirement of a bureaucrat translates into a 13 per cent decrease in offspring’s income. A triple-differences approach suggests retirement of a bureaucrat father translates into a 27 per cent decrease in earnings among sons. Retirement of a bureaucrat father is associated with larger income losses for offspring working in the same industry sector as their father and in industries that have a high concentration of assets or that are controlled by the state. This paper adds evidence to the growing literature estimating the economic benefits of political connections.     

Debating Indonesia’s Reformasi: Bridging “Parallel Universes”

Fifteen years after the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, scholars still continue to disagree over why he fell and what the subsequent process of political transition has actually entailed. A review of the literature reveals two competing interpretations. In the liberal camp, scholars draw on transition theories and argue that the fall of Suharto was caused by a “people power” mobilisation. Other scholars in the oligarchy literature who adopt theories of political economy, however, question this interpretation and argue that the fall of Suharto entailed a reorganisation of patrimonialism. The latter has been criticised by liberals for underestimating the significance of changes in post-Suharto Indonesia, though little engagement has taken place between these camps, which now constitute two “parallel universes.” This article argues that while the oligarchy camp tends to emphasise continuity, it still provides us with important insights into changes in post-Suharto Indonesia which are not adequately recognised by liberals. This is largely because their different theoretical roots prevent meaningful conversations. By reframing the oligarchy literature using the language of transition theories, this article clarifies the difference in the nature of change these two camps are respectively concerned with in the hopes of stimulating more constructive engagements between them.     

Privatising the war on drugs

A defining feature of the ‘9/11 wars’ has been the prominent role played by private military and security companies (pmsc). The growth of this market for military and security services has not gone unnoticed. Yet the role pmsc have played in supporting the US-led war on drugs has largely gone under the radar, both literally and figuratively. The aim of this article is to look at the activities of pmsc funded by the USA in Latin America, and to consider the specific consequences that arise from employing them in the field of counter-narcotics. It is argued that the use of pmsc further entrenches a costly and unsuccessful way of dealing with drugs. There is a need to move from a strict prohibitionist stance and consider alternatives to the war on drugs approach, but the use of pmsc creates another strong vested interest in maintaining an increasingly problematic and costly status quo.     

Japan's emerging role as a 'global ordinary power'

In this article we argue that since 1945 Japanese foreign policyhas evolved through five phases, which will culminate in Japan'sre-emergence as a global ordinary power. We then discuss threepotential models of ordinary power that are ideal-typical innature, but which share some qualities with the respective politicalcircumstances of France, Germany, and Britain. We also considerthe legitimacy and capacity deficits that Japan possesses, andthe way in which recent electoral developments may contributeto the addressing of these deficits. We argue that Japan isusing the British model as a foundation for the acquisitionof ordinary power status. In doing so it is increasingly bindingitself to the United States. But such a move can also providea platform from which to develop the possibilities that liebeyond bilateralism (plus), in the realm of the German model,and wider regional cooperation.