THE DILEMMAS OF A CIVILIAN POLITICIAN IN TIME OF WAR: ZHOU FOHAI AND THE FIRST STAGE OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR,JULY–DECEMBER 1937

Abstract

History’s verdict on Zhou Fohai is that he was an arch-collaborator, the éminence grise of Wang Jingwei’s government. Yet Zhou’s political career in the 1930s as a member of Chiang Kai-shek’s factional network did not suggest his later activities as a highly placed collaborator. Prior to 1938, Zhou had little or no political connections to Wang Jingwei; indeed, prior to the outbreak of war he regarded Wang and his followers as bitter factional enemies. Zhou’s background, therefore, underscores the complexity and indeed contingency of collaboration in the Sino-Japanese War. This article examines three areas of Zhou’s activities in the Guomindang Party-State during the first six months of the Sino-Japanese War: his role as a Chiang Kai-shek loyalist helping to craft key policies; his involvement with developing the United Front after the Lushan Conference; and his part in efforts to seek a negotiated peace with the aim of preserving as much of China’s sovereignty as possible. The article argues that these peace efforts were not in themselves a harbinger of collaboration, but were in fact conducted within the framework of the Party-State and involved a variety of leading figures. Despite Zhou’s liaison with the communist representatives, he remained staunchly anti-communist and suspicious of their ultimate ambitions, a suspicion that only deepened with the Guomindang’s every military reverse. And in his efforts to effect peace negotiations, he faced insurmountable obstacles in Chiang’s decision to pursue the military option, in the failure of international mediation by the leading Western powers, and in Japan’s ratcheting up its demands as its army went from victory to victory. By early 1938, therefore, Zhou was profoundly pessimistic about China’s prospects in its war with Japan.     

NEWS AS A WEAPON: HOLLINGTON TONG AND THE FORMATION OF THE GUOMINDANG CENTRALIZED FOREIGN PROPAGANDA SYSTEM, 1937–1938

Abstract

This article examines the process of the centralization of the Guomindang (GMD) foreign propaganda system during 1937 and 1938. The US-trained journalist Hollington Tong was the key person linking Chiang Kai-shek with the English-language press cohort. Based on his personal news network in the treaty ports, Tong extended the government’s propaganda network in the United States and Britain. He professionalized the propaganda institution and pursued a “hands off policy,” co-opting foreign journalists by offering them substantial assistance. This article challenges the perceived passivity of China’s foreign propaganda activities and argues that foreign propaganda was an important war strategy for the GMD government after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Factionalism played an important role in expediting the centralization process. It was Chiang’s patronage that allowed Tong, a new member of the GMD, to lead the foreign propaganda system and pursue a liberal censorship policy.     

论日本战后皇国史观和军国史观的回潮

日本战败投降后,美国为了把日本拉进西方集团的营垒,对昭和天皇不予起诉,并通过旧金山条约对日本彻底“松绑”,一大批负有战争责任的政客、官僚、财阀要员重新钻进政坛,战时的“皇国史观”和“军国史观”等货色开始回潮。随着冷战的深化,日本在追随西方积极反共、反社会主义阵营的同时,不断变换手法,朝着政治、军事大国化的目标迈进。发展到今天,日本陆海空自卫队公然联合开进战区,和平宪法被彻底架空,日本总理再三再四地连续参拜靖国神社,日本的动向引起亚洲人民的警觉和不安。     

苏联末期的货币战——透视苏联解体的新视角

苏联末期,在卢布贬值的未来预期下,各加盟共和国展开激烈的银行信贷竞争,同时实行了限制卢布涌入、物资流出的经济封锁。进而,面对俄联邦汹涌而至的卢布潮水,发行主权货币成为小国寡民型共和国防止卢布占领、摆脱自身经济困境的良策。而某个加盟共和国的主权货币行动必然在整个苏联内部引发多米诺骨牌效应。统一的卢布流通域遭遇被15个彼此独立的货币流通域瓜分并取代的命运,作为主权国家的苏联也就在货币层面被摧毁。考察苏联末期的货币战是探寻苏联解体过程的一条重要线索,对于揭开苏联解体之谜具有一定的启示意义。     

EXHIBITING CHINESENESS: THE TAIWAN PROVINCIAL EXPOSITION OF 1948

Abstract

During the immediate postwar years, visual propaganda served as constitutive and instrumental means for the Nationalist government to “decolonize” the minds of people in Taiwan. The 1948 Taiwan Provincial Exposition highlighted the impact of politics on exhibitions during the critical period in Taiwan’s history. Unable to hold it in the national capital of Nanjing as initially planned, the Provincial Exposition Committee nonetheless maintained the core mission, “enhancing the mainlanders’ understanding of Taiwan,” and strove to mobilize official and individual participants from the mainland. Financed mainly by state-run enterprises, the Exposition delivered a spectacle in serving conservative interests, as encoded in the Exposition’s slogan, “Ensuring Prosperity through Stability.” The Exposition may be seen as an illuminating case to review postwar Taiwan at the threshold of a new era. This paper aims to reveal the complex, and perhaps paradoxical, narrative structures and competitive cultural forces behind the Exposition in redefining Taiwan as a part of China.     

试析1937-1941年的中苏关系

抗战时期,中苏两国的国际地位和实力的差异,决定了苏联对华政策在双边关系中发挥主导作用。随着国际局势的变化,苏联对外战略的演变直接影响两国关系的发展。当苏联战略需要与中国利益一致时,苏联大力援助中国的抗战事业,两国关系就能顺利发展。而当苏联的战略需要背离中国利益时,苏联外交的大国主义作法则越发明显,甚至为了确保自身的安全而牺牲中国利益。因此,在时局发生剧变之时,中苏对外战略重心的转移使得两国关系不可避免地趋于冷淡。     

朝鲜战争对毛泽东外交战略思想的影响

朝鲜战争使毛泽东确立了联苏反美的外交战略,使毛泽东充分认识到了联合国的作用,认识到了世界上大多数弱小国家的作用,为其提出第三世界理论奠定了基础。朝鲜战争也使毛泽东对人的力量的认识达到了极至,反映在外交战略上,形成了他以人口大国立足世界和制衡美苏的战略思想。     

东北亚地区安全形势与我国面临的安全挑战

东北亚地区异质政治文明与非兼容战略目标的并存,使东北亚地区在政治上表现出鲜明的非整合性特征;遗留的冷战遗产和因热点问题引发的国家间对抗,使该地区安全形势处于"两难"与"困境"之中;涉及到资源、环境等各个方面的非传统安全问题呈现出愈来愈突出的发展态势。在中国致力建设多元均衡的东北亚安全秩序之际,美国在关系到中国根本安全利益的台湾问题上向中国直接挑战,并利用对华政策的不确定性干扰中国对外政策的一贯性,利用对华政策的矛盾性牵制中国和平崛起战略的统筹性。中国必须准确识别美国针对中国综合安全的政治讹诈,保持清醒,及时调整自身战略的阶段性目标,控制内政与外交的节奏,稳健发展,在发展中求安全。