Disciplined and undisciplined repression: illicit economies and state violence in Central Asia’s autocracies

What explains the use of disciplined repression in some autocratic regimes and undisciplined repression in others? Despite its relevance to these broader debates on authoritarianism, this question remains inadequately explained in conventional approaches to repression. This article proposes that autocrats’ discipline over the use of state repression is a consequence of their differential control over illicit commercial networks. Autocratic regimes that consolidate their control over rents become dependent on security apparatuses to deepen and maintain that control. These regimes invest in and support the development of coercive capabilities, which leads to more disciplined state repression. Where autocratic regimes do not control illicit networks and rents, their dependence on security offices is low. Consequently, their investment in coercive capacity suffers, giving rise to patterns of undisciplined repression. This article explores the empirical implications of these regime trajectories through a controlled comparison of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two drug transit states in post-Soviet Eurasia whose coercive institutions and patterns of state violence have developed in markedly different ways.     

Gringo: a coming-of-age in Latin America

The classic studies of the authoritarian personality imply that free‐and‐just societies would need a different kind of personality. Social structure and personality are interdependent. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts but the nature of the parts is not irrelevant. Without a truly utopian world, we have to guess at what such personalities would look like—an important, often neglected insight of Marx. So we look for hints in a less‐than‐perfect world. Towards that end novelists have offered, intentionally and unintentionally, certain indices or codes of the kind of personality necessary for a just world. Kazantzakis’ Zorba is one such hint, as seen in his autonomy, manifested most importantly in his anti‐nationalism. In Zorba we see that community is possible where he has become “free” (rejection of nationalism, etc.); it is not possible where he is not “free” (vis‐à‐vis women). The paradox is that the just society needs autonomous personalities. Crudely put, real human community might require personalities who do not need it.     

Myanmar's Electoral System: Reviewing the 2010 and 2012 Elections and Looking Ahead to the 2015 General Elections

Myanmar's 2010 multi-party election was the nation's first in two decades, signaling a manufactured transition from nearly half a century of military dictatorship toward parliamentary democracy. The current single-member district, plurality voting electoral system limits the parliamentary representation of smaller, ethnic political parties, and inflates the influence of larger, enfranchised parties, jeopardizing peaceful national reconciliation between various factions and the country's inchoate democratic institutions. Myanmar's Union Electoral Commission should consider electoral reforms that: (a) maximize proportional representation; (b) guarantee peace and political stability; and (c) guarantee a sufficient parliamentary majority that can govern the nascent democracy. The ideal system for the upcoming 2015 general elections is a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) one, with one parliamentary house electing ministers by plurality in regional districts and the other with proportional representation by party list. This paper considers alternative electoral systems in light of the status quo and argues that MMP would produce the most stable and representative results for all parties concerned.     

威权政治下的宪法权威--二战后东亚国家的政治体制转型

威权政治是在"整体号召机制"下施行的"强人政治".在威权政治下,宪法在文本上享有至上权威,在实践中则因遭受政治权威的贬抑而被规避、被僭越,这既是威权政治得以施行的前提,又是施行威权政治的逻辑结果.宪法权威之奠立有赖于威权政治向民主政治的转换,同时,民主政治的建设也有赖于奠定宪法统治的至上权威,两者是互补共生的.     

权威主义及其转型的理论分析

在现代政治学中，权威主义作为一个政治概念，有着不同的理解。作为当今世界实际存在的一种政治形态，权威主义实际上是指介乎极权政治与现代民主政治之间的一种过渡型的政治体制，它既有民主的成分，又有对集权的强制。权威主义一般产生于集权专制统治向民主政治过渡的国家，表现出过渡性、合法性、现代性、实用性等特征，它为经济发展提供稳定的局面，为向民主政治迈进打下了一定基础。政治发展的逻辑与现实决定着权威政治不会作为常态存续下去，应向民主政治转型。     

Putin as a flexible politician. Does he imitate Stalin?

The article is about Putin's ‘Jewish anomaly’. Against all expectations, Putin during his tenure as president of the Russian Federation showed in various ways his concern about the life of Jews in his country.     

Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation,Contestation and Discourse

Contemporary authoritarian regimes frequently coexist with a range of non-governmental associations, while resisting any trajectory towards democratization. This article reviews three major explanations for such political interactions, before proposing an alternative explanatory framework, using Young's dualistic approach to civil society. This approach stresses that the discursive role of civil society needs to be understood in order to explain the dynamics of coercion and cooperation faced by civil society organizations under authoritarian rule.     

Lock them up! Punitive aggression and populism as political vigilantism

Populist leaders and movements are incredibly diverse, but one factor that most share is the tendency to pick fights. Populists often stir up conflict and use aggressive rhetoric that would destroy the reputation of mainstream politicos. Furthermore, many of these fights have little material benefit for base-level supporters, and often actively harm them. Yet populist militants generally reward combative behavior. Why is populism so conflict prone? And why do populists so often escape negative consequences for provoking damaging dustups? I argue that these sorts of conflict are driven by an emotional impulse that lies at the heart of populism: punitive aggression. Populists view political problems as the result of malign actions by hostile outgroups, and they perceive the state as either negligently allowing or actively abetting these actions. The failure of the state to punish the guilty breeds an intense and deep-seated desire to harm those seen as violating norms and values, regardless of the cost. Observational and experimental data are consistent with the hypothesis that, while the never-ending conflict typical of populism may harm its adherents’ interests, it continues because it satisfies much more basic emotional and psychological needs. This paper suggests that confronting and challenging populists may be difficult because forceful responses will reinforce the bond between the leader and his or her followers.     

Blogging Zhanaozen: hegemonic discourse and authoritarian resilience in Kazakhstan

Post-Soviet authoritarian regimes – particularly in Central Asia – have proved highly resilient since independence. Existing explanations for regime longevity should be augmented by consideration of non-material, discursive sources of political legitimacy. A robust authoritarian regime requires the production and circulation of a hegemonic discourse that is internalized by influential social groups. This type of dominant discourse has emerged in Kazakhstan, making it difficult for political opponents to promote alternative political imaginaries and mobilize popular support. State control over media is challenged by Internet-based platforms, but in Kazakhstan social media and blogging have also offered an opportunity for the regime to reproduce its own hegemonic discourse. This article uses a discourse analysis of posts by bloggers in the aftermath of a violent conflict in Zhanaozen in Kazakhstan in 2011 to demonstrate how central elements in the state discourse are reproduced online, even by independent bloggers, suggesting that an official discourse has the ability to maintain its hegemonic status despite widespread use of blogs and social media.     

“Survival of the fittest:” Domestic and international dimensions of the authoritarian reaction in the former Soviet Union following the colored revolutions

This article examines the internal and external reactions by post-Soviet autocrats to the colored revolutions. First, the colored revolutions provoked incumbents in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and other post-Soviet countries to strengthen domestic efforts to preempt opposition challenges. Preemptive measures included restrictions on independent civil society, disruptions of independent electoral monitoring, promotion of pro-government civil society groups, and assaults on opposition and democracy assistance. Such actions, together with already existing endowments, allowed these regimes to survive. Next, the colored revolutions stimulated increased coordination among non-democratic states to squash opposition. Measures included counter-monitoring of elections to offset Western claims of fraud, and increased efforts at military and economic cooperation such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Simultaneously, Russia sought to destabilize Georgia and Ukraine through economic and, in Georgia, military pressure. This authoritarian backlash following the colored revolutions buttressed the surviving autocracies, which prospects for democratization have become even more bleak and distant.