略论中国行政机关权属争端之解决进路——以行政诉讼为主轴的多元主义视角

行政机关权属纠纷在中国普遍存在,而现行争议解决机制却处理不利.故有必要引入机关诉讼、完善第三人诉讼制度且以该正式机制为主要途径与多元主义非正式解决方案配合互补,在具体操作上实现内部机制优先与外部诉讼保障之并育,以期完善中国的行政组织法律体制,规范行政机关的权限关系,进而推进中国政府间权限争端解决机制的渐进性构建.     

论未成年人犯罪的社会调查之争——以社会调查主体之争为切入点

对未成年犯罪个案开展社会调查成为刑事诉讼法所规定的法定少年司法制度,有力地推动了我国少年司法的发展。但刑事诉讼法修改时,对社会调查的原则化规制以及指导司法实践的具体配套规范的缺失,共同导致这一制度在施行过程中出现了调查主体之争的白热化。实际上,调查主体之争的背后是司法权力配置之争。要化解权力配置之争及其引发的后续问题,必须从厘清主体之争的现实和理论成因着手,跨越社会调查活动开展的前置性障碍,建立起社会调查必要性评估机制,以共享和制约为权力分享的前提,合理权衡公检法三机关的司法权力配置之需,结合各地的司法实践需要和司法资源优势,建构起相对统一规范的社会调查主体机制。     

我国医疗纠纷举证责任分配制度演变及其述评

我国的医疗纠纷诉讼举证责任分配制度大致经历了三个阶段：即“谁主张，谁举证”阶段、举证责任倒置阶段和区分类型确定举证责任阶段。“谁主张，谁举证”阶段过分强调保护医务人员的权益，忽略了对病人权益的保护；举证责任倒置阶段虽平衡了患者举证难而医务人员举证易的矛盾，但忽略了治疗技术和方法的创新，“保守”医疗应运而生；区分类型确定举证责任阶段进一步完善了我国医疗纠纷举证责任分配制度。医疗机构、医生及患者的权益均得到有效保护，但实际效果有待在实践中检验。     

中国古代民事诉讼性质新论

中国古代民事诉讼是否依法裁判，学界争论较大。根据数据统计难以得出依法裁判的结论。对此应该辩证认识。古代中国未能表面依法裁判既有当代人的理解问题，还受到立法因素、司法制度、结案方式、社会结构等因素的制约，这些因素并未影响依法裁判的大格局，在当代中国，追求法律效果与社会效果一致的同时，不能因法律变通影响规则的确定性，应理顺民俗习惯与司法的关系。     

论医疗纠纷行政调解制度之重构

医疗纠纷行政调解作为一种诉讼外纠纷解决方式应当遵循自愿原则、效率原则和合法原则。在具体制度设计上可以考虑在县级以上地方政府法制部门成立相对独立的机构负责医疗纠纷行政调解，同时要设计既简便又实用的行政调解程序，赋予调解协议以合同效力，从而充分发挥行政调解在医疗纠纷解决中的作用。     

捕诉工作协调监督机制研究

捕诉工作协调监督机制反映了检察机关内部侦查监督部门与公诉部门的一种分工协调关系。加强捕诉协调监督机制建设是检察机关业务建设的重要组成部分,强化捕诉衔接,促进捕诉协调,形成捕诉互补办案机制,是提高刑事办案质量及诉讼效率、发挥检察机关在诉讼监督方面整体效能的重要方面。     

检察权的外部监督制约机制研究

检察权的外部监督制约机制主要包括外部权力监督和权利监督两个方面.检察权的外部权力监督在法律层面上完善国家权力机关(人大)对检察权的监督以及公安机关和人民法院对检察权的制约.在权利监督制约层面,则要增强犯罪嫌疑人、被告人、被害人、辩护人的防御性权利和完善救济性权利,建立和完善人民监督员的社会权利监督制度,形成对检察权有效监督制约.     

Difficulties Confronted by ICSID Tribunals in Deciding International Investment Corruption Cases and Possible Solutions

The issue of corruption has attracted increasing attention in the study and practice of international investment law during recent years. After taking prudent consideration of the corruption defense invoked by the host states in some international investment arbitration cases involved with corruption, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals accordingly determined the final awards. However, some parts of the arbitral jurisprudence aroused strong criticism, especially with regard to the ICSID tribunals’ reasoning that arbitrators have no jurisdiction over corruption-tainted international investments. The ICSID tribunals are legitimately supposed to exercise their jurisdiction and are lawfully obliged to probe into the nature of corrupt activities. The tribunals are strongly expected to adopt a balanced approach in deciding the merits and fairly weighing the obligations, rights, and interests of both disputing parties. It is preferable to strengthen the collaborative interaction between ICSID proceedings and domestic anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms when it comes to combating corrupt international investment activities. Existing international treaties (or specific treaty provisions) on combating corruption in international business transactions and calling for international cooperation, alongside domestic anti-corruption enforcement legislation, have actually laid solid legal foundations for the establishment of such an anti-corruption coordinative mechanism between ICSID and domestic corruption regulatory authorities on the global level.     

Can Needs-Based Grants Improve Local Transit Performance? Varying Effects by Level of Control

Needs-based grant programs are budgeting systems that tie grant dollars to the needs of the grantees as determined by objective indicators. Although performance improvement is not an explicit goal of such grants, the associated awards could work as incentives for grantees to meet the grant criteria. In other words, grantees seek to improve their performance to fulfill the criteria, even though the grant-makers intend such grants to support the existing operational needs of the grantees. This study tests these assertions in the context of the small transit intensive cities (STIC) grant that was established as a needs-based grant system by the federal government to support small local transit agencies operating with unusually high service demands. This study argues that these systems would have a stronger impact on indicators over which grantees have more control. This study tests these assertions using a difference-in-differences analysis of 290 transit agencies over 17 years. The findings show that STIC is effective in improving grantee performance, at least on the indicators which are more amenable to control.     

超大城市精细化管理的地方实践与反思

当前,以精细化管理引领超大城市发展已成为重要战略导向.相关研究表明,有必要对超大城市精细化管理面临的内在风险和困境进行深度反思,如精细化管理与"过制度化"之间的关系有待商榷,"熟悉式"治理并非尽善尽美,对秩序和确定性的过度追求存在内生性风险与局限,"技术至上"与系统施策之间存在冲突,精细化管理面临"应用条件"的约束.从...