When civil engagement is part of the problem: Flawed anti-corruptionism in Russia and Ukraine

In developing countries, the fight against corruption entails purges of political and business elites and the restructuring of electoral, financial, and social provision systems, all of which are costly for the incumbents and, therefore, unlikely without sustained pressure from civil society. In the absence of empirical analyses, scholars and practitioners have, therefore, assumes that civil society plays an unequivocally positive role in anti-corruptionism. In this article, we challenge this dominant assumption. Instead, we show that, under certain conditions, an engaged non-governmental community may, in fact, undermine the fight against corruption. Using the data from forty interviews with anti-corruption practitioners in Ukraine and Russia, as well as primary documentary sources, we present two models of anti-corruptionism whereby active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes. One is faux collaboration, defined as a façade of cooperation between the state and civil society, which hides the reality of one-sided reforms. The other model is that of non-collaborative co-presence, whereby the governance role is shared by the government and non-governmental activists without compromise-based solutions. In both cases, civil engagement helps perpetuate abuses of power and subvert such long-term goals of anti-corruption reforms as democratization and effective governance.     

An Anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaydan Compared

This article surveys and discusses the latest wave of mass protests in Ukraine, the Euromaydan. This study situates the Euromaydan within the history of the other protests in post-communist Ukraine and makes a comparison to the Orange Revolution (the Orange Revolution). The authors recognize the importance of international factors, but argue that Ukrainian domestic political factors contributed significantly not only to the emergence, but also to escalation of the latest conflict in Ukraine. This study tests a theory about the role of institutional factors versus the role of cultural-historic legacies in the process of mass protest formation and conflict development. We argue that institutional factors, such as: governmental policies; the composition of governmental, opposition, and civil society groups; corruption; and timing of legislative activity on most divisive issues in Ukraine have contributed to the conflict escalation in Ukraine.     

US democracy assistance programs in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution

The 2004 Orange Revolution failed to skyrocket Ukraine into the ranks of consolidated democracies. Some previous research claimed that, in the similar case of post-Rose Revolution Georgia, its vague democratic perspectives can be explained by, among others, a negative impact of politically biased US democracy assistance programs. This article examines five groups of US programs (electoral aid, political party development, legislative strengthening, NGO development and media strengthening) implemented in Ukraine in 2005–2010, and concludes that US diplomatic support for the pro-Western “Orange” leadership did not translate into political bias of US-funded democracy assistance programs.     

The IHRA Definition of Antisemitism: Defining Antisemitism by Erasing Palestinians

The IHRA definition is one of the most contentious documents in the history of efforts to combat antisemitism. Although it first became well known in the UK as a result of disputes within the Labour Party, the definition reaches well beyond that context, and has been adopted by universities, city councils, and governments. With its intensive focus on the critique of Israel as a marker of antisemitism, the IHRA definition has been heavily implicated in the suppression of Israel-critical speech in recent years. This article is among the first to adopt a global perspective on the definition—both its history and its content—clarifying the political stakes of this definition and broader paratextual apparatus for a general audience, and provides an explanation of why it should be rejected rather than used to censor Israel-critical speech.     

Trust,mental models and community participation in transition: Evidence from rural Ukraine

As participatory governance approaches find their way into the development agendas in transition countries, a key question is how to increase citizens’ participation rates. This study examines how social trust and mental models inherited from the communist past shape individual decisions to participate in rural collective action. Using unique data from rural Ukraine, I approach these questions empirically distinguishing different types of participation. I find that social trust and mental models about the roles of communities and the state stemming from the Soviet past affect participation with some reservations. Results suggest that community-driven initiatives should invest more in educational and awareness-raising activities.     

An unlikely bulwark of Sovietness: cross-border travel and Soviet patriotism in Western Ukraine, 1956–1985

Focusing on the development of travel between the borderlands of Ukraine and Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, this article explores what it meant to be Soviet outside the Russian core of the USSR between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. The cautious opening of the Soviet border was part of a larger attempt to find fresh sources of popular support and enthusiasm for the regime's “communist” project. Before the Prague Spring of 1968 in particular, official policies and narratives of travel thus praised local inhabitants who crossed the Soviet border for supposedly overcoming age-old hatreds to build a brighter future in Eastern Europe. By the 1970s, however, smuggling and cultural consumption discredited the idea of “internationalist friendship.” This encouraged residents of Ukraine to speak and write about the continuing importance of the Soviet border. The very idea of Sovietness was defined in national terms, as narratives of travel emphasized that Soviet citizens were inherently different from ethno-national groups in the people's democracies. Eastern Europe thus emerged as an “other” that highlighted the Soviet character of territories incorporated into the USSR after 1939, helping to obscure western Ukraine's troubled past and leading to the emergence of new social hierarchies in the region.     

Redefining development for national security: implications for civil society

The effects of counter-terrorism legislation on civil-society organisations (CSOs) based in the South have received little attention in the wider literature. This article reports on the findings of a series of international workshops to examine the effects of such legislation, held in Lebanon, the Kyrgyz Republic, India, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA. The evidence presented at these workshops suggests that counter-terror legislation is undermining the work of civil society in complex and interrelated ways.     

欧元模式与东亚货币合作模式的比较分析

作为两种典型的国际货币合作模式,欧元模式和东亚货币合作模式适应了不同区域的历史文化特点和政治制度与经济发展的需要,在国际区域货币合作领域具有重要的代表意义。在国际区域货币合作的形成动因、路径选择、"锚货币"确立及最优货币区标准的满足程度等方面,二者之间既有一定共性又有诸多区别,通过对比,可以更清晰地看出东亚货币合作的优长和不足之处、进程缓慢的主要原因以及加快前行的方向所在。     

俄罗斯农民的东正教信仰

俄罗斯农民的东正教,大量渗透了农民自己传统信仰的成分,有些是打着信仰东正教的名义,行的是多神教或传统信仰的诸多内容。俄罗斯农民作为一个缺少文化的下层群体,在东正教信仰上,特别迷信于俄国东正教特有的圣像崇拜,专心于神秘主义。对这个问题的研究,不仅能透视出被俄国农民改造了的拜占庭东正教文化—俄罗斯东正教文化的保守落后的实质;也能透视出俄国农民在俄国历史发展中起到的阻碍进步或阻碍改革的历史作用;更重要的是,能透视出俄国,这个革命前农民占绝大多数的国家,因文化的落后而频频引发的社会危机和政治危机。俄国落后的根本原因就是农民因素。     

Social media and Russian territorial irredentism: some facts and a conjecture

ABSTRACT

After Kremlin policymakers decided to incorporate the territory of Crimea into Russia, updates on public attitudes in Russian-speaking communities elsewhere in Ukraine would have been in high demand. Because social media users produce content in order to communicate ideas to their social networks, online political discourse can provide important clues about the political dispositions of communities. We map the evolution of Russian-speakers’ attitudes, expressed on social media, across the course of the conflict as Russian analysts might have observed them at the time. Results suggest that the Russian-Ukrainian interstate border only moved as far as their military could have advanced while incurring no occupation costs – Crimea, and no further.