Eurasian integration: elite perspectives before and after the Ukraine crisis

A European scholar explores the changing dynamics of integration processes within the Eurasian Customs/Economic Union in the new context created by the Ukraine crisis. The article examines positions adopted by member states Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus before and after onset of the crisis in Ukraine. Several rationales for justifying the Union are derived from international relations theory and documented in the rhetoric of actors from these three countries. The evolution of conflicting rhetorical postures mirrors a slowdown of the Eurasian integration process and growth in the bargaining leverage of Belarus and Kazakhstan vis-à-vis Moscow.     

“The Last of the Mohicans?” The IRA's “Operation Harvest” in an International Context

In 1956, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) launched “Operation Harvest,” an overtly ambitious guerrilla effort that was meant to secure the political unity of Ireland by force of arms. It was waged against the backdrop of a “thaw” in international relations and drew inspiration from successful anti-colonial guerrilla struggles in Algeria and Cyprus. The IRA was unaware of the simultaneous, parallel, unsuccessful irredentist efforts in Central and Eastern Europe in which anti-communist guerrillas clashed with totalitarian security apparatuses of the USSR or its satellite states. Studying the latter campaigns, which had begun earlier and were conducted by far larger and more effective guerrilla forces, might have convinced the organisation that such insurgencies in post-1945 Europe had very little hope of success. This article for the first time thematically contrasts the irredentist efforts of the IRA and the parallel Central and Eastern European guerrillas. It aims to bring to light cases that are hardly ever discussed in the Irish context but which could be of surprising use if one wishes to comparatively assess Ireland or the IRA.     

The European Union and Belarus: democracy promotion by technocratic means?

Is Belarus an enviable constant in international relations: a maverick, isolated from the West and inseparable from the East? On the surface, there seems to be business as usual: Lukashenko's regime remains unchallenged; Belarus’ relations with the European Union – spasmodic at best; while its absorption into Russia's Eurasian project continues apace. Yet, some critical disjunctures – manifested in government tacit resistance to Russia's influence, and more instructively, in people's growing affinity with Europe – may indicate a sea-change transformation in the very fabric of society. This article, utilizing extensive and subject-focused research, conducted in the country between 2009 and 2013, examines the nature and causalities of the occurring change. It argues that democracy promotion, in Belarus’ case, may work better when depoliticized and inculcated, through norms, regulations, and practices of international order, into the daily lives of individuals. Through its continued technocratic, inclusive, and sector-level engagement, European Union governance, even under the conditions of limited bilateral dialogue, have succeeded in fostering much-needed space for reciprocal learning and critical reasoning, which may have far greater transformative potential than manufacturing a single collective will for democracy building.     

The search for the Russian Mafia

After the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, newspapers, films, academic researchers and intelligence agencies warned against a new phenomenon in organized crime: the “Russian mafiya.” In fact, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western European countries have noted an increase in the number of criminals from Central and Eastern Europe. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch judicial authorities made the issue a priority and established a special team to investigate crime with links to Eastern Europe. From 1999 to 2005, the KT NON crime team published several studies and reports on serious crime of this nature. In this paper, the authors, who were assigned to the KT NON crime team, discuss the findings of the two most recent publications on the “causes, nature, scale and threat of Central and Eastern European crime” and “mobile banditry,” respectively. They come to the conclusion that among other forms of crime, the phenomenon of mobile banditry seems to be the most serious manifestation of crime from post-communist countries. The Russian mafia was not found.

回溯性求偿与国际战争的诱发

既有理性主义战争成因理论认为围绕战争的预期效用计算主导着国家冲突行为的选择。将沉没成本和各类既往互动经历纳入效用计算在上述理论路径下被视为非理性行为。这种理论偏见限制了理性主义战争成因理论的解释力。事实上，对于物质和时间沉没成本的关注导致了国家行为体互动时呈现极端的相对收益敏感。为规避特定一方的相对物质收益或时间优势过度累积而使冲突双方实力失衡，自认为处于损失框架下的国家不时地采取无法被对方所接受的回溯性求偿行为，进而使冲突双方的和解方案交集被极大限缩；加之求偿国与被求偿国判断对方所持决策框架时产生的认知落差，冲突双方的风险承担意愿随之增加，同时双方也高估对方的敌意而低估对方的冲突决心，冲突升级为战争的可能性因而增加。2022年的乌克兰危机和第一次世界大战前的军事动员竞赛可以分别论证两类典型的回溯性求偿行为——围绕物质利益争夺展开的受害者—加害者战略互动和为争夺时间优势而被迫采取的后发先至策略——对国际战争的诱发性影响。     

国际社会对全球安全倡议的多重认知与中国的推进策略

全球安全倡议是破解全球安全困境的中国方案。全球安全倡议提出后受到国际社会的极大关注，相关分析对于全球安全倡议提出的背景、意图、价值、实施步骤和面临的挑战进行了多方面解读。这些分析认为中国提出倡议的动机主要包括打造新安全秩序论、贡献安全机遇论、提升安全话语论、维护国家安全论及另起炉灶论等。全球安全倡议能够纠正国际安全秩序失衡状况，推动构建国际和地区安全新架构，同时动摇美国对国际安全事务的霸主地位，提升中国的国际安全话语权与地区影响力。当前，国际层面的分析从评估中国提出全球安全倡议的意图转向批判性地评估中国将倡议付诸行动的能力。总体上，国际舆论对全球安全倡议可行性的态度包括积极响应、谨慎乐观、中立观望、质疑担忧和否定抵制五派论调。国际负面认知的原因既有西方地缘政治安全的理论荒谬原因，也有美国追求对抗性权力博弈的实践霸道原因；既有国际倡议被误读的一般原因，又有安全倡议被误读的特殊原因；既有国际社会根深蒂固安全竞争的外部原因，也有倡议作为新理念尚待具体化的内部原因。基于“舆论—回应”机制，中国应理性看待这些负面认知，采取有针对性的应对策略，消除部分国家对全球安全倡议的误解。坚持多方位传播，推动更多国家支持并加入全球安全倡议，打造不可分割的安全共同体，探索中国特色热点问题解决之道。     

Emigrant external voting in Central-Eastern Europe after EU enlargement

The European Union's Eastern Enlargement of 2004–2007 triggered a large wave of migration. While the influence of Central-Eastern European (CEE) migrants on Western European politics has been studied, the impact of outward migration and political remittances “sent” by expatriates remain unexplored, despite the salience of democratic backsliding and populist politics in the region. We ask how external voting among migrants differs from electoral results in homelands over time, drawing on an original dataset gathering voting results among migrants from six CEE countries in fifteen Western European host countries. Using models estimated with Bayesian ordinary least squares regression, we test three hypotheses: two related to the disparity of diaspora votes from homeland party systems over time; and one to the ideological leanings of diasporas. We observe a growing discrepancy and note that diaspora votes follow the ideological fluctuations in the country of origin but distort it, with CEE migrants voting for more liberal and more economically right-wing parties than voters ‘at home’.