The incumbency disadvantage in South Korean National Assembly elections: Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach

In marked contrast to the findings from advanced democracies that incumbent office holders enjoy electoral advantages, this study finds that a substantial incumbency disadvantage exists in South Korean National Assembly (KNA) elections. I employ a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity design to distinguish the true effects of incumbency from the selection effects associated with candidate qualities, such as charisma and ability levels. My results show that serving a term in office reduces the probability of winning by around 20–30 percentage points and reduces the vote share by about 3–7 percentage points. Possible reasons for the incumbency disadvantage are briefly discussed, with an emphasis on the particularly high level of public discontent with governing elites in the KNA due to what voters perceive to be their widespread corruption.     

Elections and selfishness

Elections affect the division of resources in society and are occasions for political elites to make appeals rooted in voters' self-interest. Hence, elections may erode altruistic norms and cause people to behave more selfishly. We test this intuition using Dictator Games in a lab-in-the-field experiment involving a sample of more than 1000 individuals in Kenya and Tanzania. We adopt two approaches. First, we experimentally prime participants to think about the upcoming or most recent elections and find that this priming treatment reduces how much money participants are willing to give to other players. Second, we compare results obtained across lab rounds in Kenya taking place right before the country's 2013 national elections and eight months prior, and find that selfishness is greater in the lab round more proximate to the election. Our results suggest that elections may affect social behavior in important—and previously unrecognized—ways.     

Do political budget cycles work? A micro-level investigation of pre-electoral budgeting and its electoral consequences

One of the most puzzling empirical patterns in political economy is the disconnect between the regular use of fiscal instruments for re-election purposes by incumbents (otherwise known as political budget cycles) on the one hand and their relative electoral ineffectiveness on the other. This article engages with this puzzle by shifting the analysis from the macro to the micro-level. It shows that when taking into account individual-level heterogeneity in the electoral response, one can gain a more nuanced understanding of the political consequences of pre-electoral budgeting. By relying on a set of multi-level random-effects regressions using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral System surveys, it points to two such sources of heterogeneity: social status and ideology. In particular, higher status individuals are considerably less responsive to pre-electoral deficits, though the effects depend on the composition of fiscal measures. Results for ideology are somewhat less consistent across different operationalizations of ideology as well as model specification.     

Making wasted votes count: Turnout,transfers, and preferential voting in practice

Proponents of electoral reform champion the single transferable vote (STV) or aligned forms of preferential voting (AV, IRV, RCV) as a method to improve participation among and representation of the general public. Voters provide an ordinal ranking among alternatives on the ballot, and ballots not used to elect a candidate are transferred to another favored alternative. Preferential voting is intended to encourage both citizen participation in an election and sincere voting. Yet the empirical evidence about the effects of preferential voting in the scholarly literature is scant. Elections of members to the Dáil Éireann, the lower house of national parliament in Ireland, provide a wealth of data on preferential voting. Data from four recent Irish elections (1997, 2002, 2007, and 2011) are analyzed to assess the effectiveness of STV on reducing wasted votes. The number of nontransferable ballots, votes not used for any candidate, is large and increases as the need for lower level preferences (that is, later counts or rounds) grows. Voter turnout does not correspond to preferential voting in predictable ways; turnout declines as the number of candidates elected increases. Although preferential voting systems have much to offer, their effects need to be evaluated.     

Presidential Primary Videocassettes: How Candidates in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Primary Elections Framed Their Early Campaigns

The present study uses frame analysis and in-depth interviews to explore the presidential primary campaign videocassettes of Gary Bauer, Bill Bradley, George W. Bush, Steve Forbes, Al Gore, and John McCain. While the candidates used a variety of frames, all six videos shared one frame: mass media as supplier of candidate validation. Interviews with the producers of the videos confirmed data from the frame analysis and aided in understanding how and why the frames were used. The study lends insight into how the candidates chose to shape the images that they first presented to the public.     

Constructing Explanations for U.S. State Governors’ Races: The Abortion Issue and the 1990 Gubernatorial Elections

Election results do not, by themselves, explain what specific policies voters want. So reporters and the politicians and activists they cover engage in a process of constructing explanations for the vote totals, to achieve their respective aims. This study examines the conditions in which a potentially influential issueabortion rights after the Webster decisionwas interpreted as an explanation for gubernatorial election outcomes in 1990. Data show that explanations constructed for the vote totals in newspaper coverage often differed from the findings of state exit polls. Abortion was more likely to be interpreted as a cause of the vote when the race was one-sided, when the candidates differed more clearly in their stands on abortion, and when some aspect of their stands fit the medias need to portray drama and conflict. Findings suggest that media norms as to what is news influence the process of constructing explanations for election results.     

Social spending,partisan bias and vote choice. Evidence from the US

Most models in political science and political economy assume that benefiting from public spending increases the likelihood of voting for the government. However, we do not have much empirical evidence on the conditions under which recipients of public spending reward governments for their public transfers. This article studies the electoral implications of welfare spending cuts in the early years of the Reagan Presidency, when public spending changes were particularly pronounced. Using 1982 NES data, this paper demonstrates that voters who lost public benefits punished Reagan but this only occurred when they identified with the Democratic Party. By contrast, benefit recipients not affected by government cuts were more likely to support Reagan, but again this was only significant among voters identifying with the party of government. This paper thus finds that governments cannot automatically “buy” votes by using welfare spending, the influence of which is instead cushioned by party identification.