世界银行与国际货币基金组织贷款交叉条件的法律分析

世界银行与国际货币基金组织在为借款国提供贷款援助时,通过交叉设定贷款条件强化贷款条件对借款国的约束力。依交叉条件设置方式不同,可分为正式的贷款交叉条件与非正式的贷款交叉条件,其中世界银行在贷款协议中对国际货币基金组织贷款条件的交叉引用,使得国际货币基金组织非条约性质的贷款条件获得了法律约束力。中国应未雨绸缪,推动国际金融组织贷款条件的实体内容与设定程序改革,并采取必要的措施弱化贷款交叉条件的法律约束力。     

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.     

Economic Sanctions and the Politics of IMF Lending

What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes.     

Should it be curtains for some of the IMF’s lending windows?

Increasing attention is being paid to IMF governance and operations, but not to how IMF programs are differentiated under the array of available lending windows. This paper examines empirically the economic and political circumstances associated with the use of IMF facilities. It therefore extends existing research into the determinants of IMF arrangements by investigating the extent to which different influences are at work in the case of different facilities. Focusing initially on extended arrangements as compared to stand-bys, the results indicate that although initially the facilities were used in different economic circumstances, since the mid 1980s these differences have largely disappeared. Instead the differences between user countries have become more political than economic. There are, however, some differences between concessionary and non-concessionary facilities beyond the income levels of countries using them. The policy implications for the range and design of the Fund’s lending windows are discussed.

IMF retrospective and prospective: A public goods viewpoint

The paper investigates changes in IMF activities using the analytical framework of international public goods. The IMF promotes international financial stability, whose outputs are joint products with varying degrees of publicness. In recent years, IMF loans (recipient-specific benefits) have assumed decreased importance, while the Fund’s technical assistance and monitoring activities have taken on greater importance. As a consequence, the club and purely public outputs (e.g., disseminating best practices) have grown as a share of IMF activities. Changes in the mix of IMF activities alter the mix of international public goods and, in so doing, change policy recommendations regarding the role of IMF. The future of IMF is also addressed, especially in light of increased private capital flows.

论人民币汇率义务的管辖归属和衡量依据

西方在人民币汇率问题上的核心意图在于舍IMF而取WTO的争端解决机制,因此,需要廓清IMF与WTO的关系以确定人民币汇率义务的管辖归属和衡量依据.合理界定二者的关系需要区分外汇措施和汇率安排.由于外汇措施与贸易措施具有交叉重叠的效果,IMF以技术方法界定外汇措施,WTO在外汇措施是否与IMF条款一致的问题上对IMF的管辖权给予充分的吸收.但是,汇率安排属于IMF专属管辖,WTO的有关规定与此无涉.西方对人民币汇率的指控属于汇率安排问题,应由IMF依其协定第4条进行监督,而不应由WTO争端解决机制解决.     

论IMF与WTO在国际收支平衡上的磋商机制

一个既为IMF成员方又为WTO成员方在履行IMF的义务时会违反WTO的义务，而履行WTO的义务时又有可能违反IMF的义务，这就构成了一成员方对IMF与WTO的义务交叉冲突；IMF与WTO的磋商机制是必需的，现有的IMF与WTO磋商机削仅具有框架性作用，WTO争端解决机制在具体个案中对IMF与WTO是否冲突没有解释的权利，只能采取回避的办法；完善IMF与WTO磋商机制势在必行。     

Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators

We examine the impact of IMF programs on economic performance in 95 developing countries over the period 1993–2002. Three macroeconomic measures of economic performance are considered: the real per capita economic growth rate, the ratio of the fiscal surplus to GDP, and the ratio of the current account surplus to GDP. Three estimation techniques are used: censored-sample, full-sample instrumental-variable, and matching. Substantively, we find little statistical support that IMF programs contemporaneously improve real economic growth in participating countries, but stronger evidence of an improvement in economic growth in years following a program. We find that both the fiscal ratio and the current-account ratio improve contemporaneously with IMF participation relative to the counterfactual, with effects in succeeding years differing little from the impact effects. We conclude that the program-effect estimates of matching and other estimators will differ largely because of the sample included in estimation. Matching by its nature excludes country episodes associated with extreme values of the propensity score, while the instrumental-variable estimator includes those. If there is heterogeneity of performance response in extreme vs. moderate cases, the estimates differ systematically between the two techniques. JEL codes F33 · F34 · C34     

GATT第15条:汇率义务衡量需提防的陷阱——基于人民币汇率义务问题的探讨

国内外论著在涉及人民币汇率义务的衡量时,普遍指向了GATT第15条,认为应当以此来确定IMF与WTO在人民币汇率义务问题上的管辖归属和衡量依据.然而,GATT第15条仅规定了IMF与WTO在经常账户下的货币兑换和国际支付方面的关系,并没有规定二者在汇率安排问题上的关系,汇率安排属于IMF辖域.西方的指责属于汇率安排问题,人民币汇率义务应由IMF依IMF协定第4条进行监督,而不应由WTO争端解决机制解决.