Legitimacy and institutional purpose

ABSTRACT

Institutions undertake a huge variety of constitutive purposes. One of the roles of legitimacy is to protect and promote an institution’s pursuit of its purpose; state legitimacy is generally understood as the right to rule, for example. When considering legitimacy beyond the state, we have to take account of how differences in purposes change legitimacy. I focus in particular on how differences in purpose matter for the stringency of the standards that an institution must meet in order to be legitimate. An important characteristic of an institution’s purpose is its deontic status, i.e. whether it is morally impermissible, merely permissible, or mandatory. Although this matters, it does so in some non-obvious ways; the mere fact of a morally impermissible purpose is not necessarily delegitimating, for example. I also consider the problem of conflicting, multiple, and contested institutional purposes, and the different theoretical roles for institutional purpose. Understanding how differences in purpose matter for an institution’s legitimacy is one part of the broader project of theorizing institutional legitimacy in the many contexts beyond the traditional context of the state.     

A political economy for social movements and revolution: popular media access,power and cultural hegemony

Abstract

One key marker of mass social movements transitioning to participatory democratic governance is popular media access. This essay argues that democratic media access by public constituencies becomes a site for constructing social revolution and simultaneously a manifest empirical measure of the extent of democratic participation in the production, distribution, and use of communication with new cultural possibilities. The participatory production practices (with citizens producing and hosting their own programs) and the democratic content (of oral histories, local issues, critiques of government and business, and everyday vernacular) reflect the hegemony of emerging ‘Bolivarian’ twenty-first century socialism expressed as popular participation in media production. Bolstered by constitutional changes and public funding, popular social movements of civil society, indigenous, women, and working class organizations have gained revolutionary ground by securing in practice the right of media production. Findings indicate that public and community media (that move beyond alternative sites of local expression and concerns) provide a startling revolutionary contrast to the commercial media operations in every nation. Popular media constructions suggest a new radically democratic cultural hegemony based on human solidarity with collective, participatory decision-making and cooperation offering real possibilities and experiences for increased equality and social justice.     

Party brand hate in political market: antecedents and consequences

ABSTRACT

Brand hate is defined as a severe dislike for a product or service by the consumer. Although brand hate has been recognized as a critical element, in the political market, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of brand hate on voters. This study is an attempt to examine the antecedents and consequences of brand hate in the political market. The study reveals that unmet expectations, symbolic incongruity, and ideological incompatibility of electorates have a significant positive impact on brand hate intensity. The result shows that political product involvement significantly mediates the relationship between unmet expectations, symbolic incongruity, and ideological incompatibility and brand hate intensity. The study further reveals that as an outcome of political brand hate, electorates put emphasis on either brand avoidance and/or brand extremism. The outcome of this study may help political parties gain knowledge about the impact of political brand hate.     

美国等西方国家对华“分化”策略的新变化及对策思考

基于政治制度和意识形态的冲突、地缘政治的竞争和战略的不信任,以美国为首的西方国家对华实施"西化""分化"的战略图谋一刻也没有松懈。近年来,中国的快速发展迫使美国调整了对华实施"分化"战略的策略;同时,由于中国正处于社会转型、改革深化的关键时期,社会矛盾的增多、社会冲突的加剧为美西方的"分化"活动提供了诸多契机和借口。面对美国等西方国家的"分化"活动出现的新形式与新特点,为了维护国家的政治安全,中国不仅要在策略方面进行应对,还需要在战略层面提出适应国家整体发展的"顶层设计",更为重要的是在"软实力"上构建一套让全世界都信服且能与西方相抗衡的价值体系。     

Evaluating the cross-national comparability of survey measures of political interest using anchoring vignettes

Making cross-groups comparisons by using survey instruments has raised substantial scholarly concerns due to the potential risk of incomparability resulting from differential item functioning (DIF). However, not every survey item necessarily suffers from DIF. In this paper, we argue that, unlike many other survey items (e.g., political efficacy), the usual question used to measure political interest is likely to be largely immune to DIF. Our theoretical argument centers on the relative specificity of the item and a corresponding cultural homogeneity (at least in advanced democracies) in what it means to be politically interested or not. Utilizing the anchoring vignettes technique (King et al., 2004; King and Wand, 2007) in our original surveys in the UK, France, and the Netherlands, we demonstrate the size of DIF is small for the standard political interest question.     

政治统一、支持监督与协商治理:中国新型政党制度的优势

中国新型政党制度是保持国家政治统一、实现权力有效监督制约和实践协商民主政治的重要制度载体.中国新型政党制度的优势主要体现在通过聚合性的政党制度结构,保持了超大规模国家的政治统一;通过非竞争支持型的政党监督模式,初步实现了政党之间的权力监督;通过多党合作和政治协商,实现了包容互惠发展导向的协商民主治理.新时代坚持和完善中国新型政党制度,需要通过制度改进和完善,进一步发挥中国新型政党制度的优势,促进国家治理现代化的实现.     

党的政治纪律建设:生成动因、历史演进与实践路径

注重政治纪律建设是马克思主义政党一以贯之的要求,也是中国共产党的历史传统和政治优势.中国共产党的发展历史,就是一部不断严明政治纪律的历史.总结党的政治纪律建设发展历史,对于新时代进一步加强党的政治纪律建设有着重要的历史借鉴作用.     

China and Africa: economic growth and a non-transformative political elite

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development.     

The Disappearance of Political Cultures in Italy

Abstract

Following the collapse of the Italian party system in 1994, post-war Italian political cultures have all but exhausted themselves, if not disappeared completely. First, the Ulivo (Olive Tree) in 1996–1998, then, the Partito Democratico in 2007–2008, attempted without much conviction to formulate a new political culture combining several traditions and heritages. This article will explore how and why the PD failed in its attempts. It will also look at the status of other political cultures, especially the federalist and the liberal, supposedly relaunched by Berlusconi in 1994. It will conclude with some reflections on the appearance of personalist parties and leaders’ narratives and provide an assessment of the present situation with specific reference to the attempt by the PD leader, Matteo Renzi, to give birth to a so-called ‘Partito della Nazione’. Is there any future for new political cultures in the Italian political system? Will the Italian party system ever be revived?     

Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory

According to a growing tradition in International Relations, one way governments can credibly signal their intentions in foreign policy crises is by creating domestic audience costs: leaders can tie their hands by publicly threatening to use force since domestic publics punish leaders who say one thing and do another. We argue here that there are actually two logics of audience costs: audiences can punish leaders both for being inconsistent (the traditional audience cost), and for threatening to use force in the first place (a belligerence cost). We employ an experiment that disentangles these two rationales, and turn to a series of dispositional characteristics from political psychology to bring the audience into audience cost theory. Our results suggest that traditional audience cost experiments may overestimate how much people care about inconsistency, and that the logic of audience costs (and the implications for crisis bargaining) varies considerably with the leader's constituency.